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Regulating Professional Sports Leagues
Nathaniel Grow*
Abstract
Four monopoly sports leagues currently dominate the U.S.
professional sports industry. Although federal antitrust law—the
primary source of regulation governing the industry—would
normally be expected to provide a significant check on
anticompetitive, monopolistic behavior, it has failed to effectively
govern the leagues due to both their well-entrenched monopoly
status and the unique level of coordination necessary among their
respective teams. Consequently, the four leagues today each, in
many respects, enjoy unregulated monopoly status in what is
estimated to be a $67 billion industry.
As one might expect, these leagues use their largely unchecked
monopoly power to injure the public in various ways. By restricting
expansion, leagues create an artificial shortage of franchises
enabling their existing teams to extract billions of dollars in
stadium subsidies from U.S. taxpayers. Similarly, by preventing
their franchises from individually licensing their broadcast rights
nationally or over the Internet, the leagues are able to demand
significantly higher fees from television networks and consumers
than would be obtainable in a competitive marketplace while at the
same time subjecting viewers to arcane and outdated blackout
provisions.
Unfortunately, existing proposals in the academic literature to
remedy this undesirable state of affairs are both impractical and
unlikely to be effective. This Article instead proposes a surprisingly
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business,
University of Georgia. I would like to thank Marc Edelman, Gordon Hylton,
Matt Mitten, Matt Parlow, Geoff Rapp, Tim Samples, Michael Waxman, and my
fellow participants at the Marquette University Law School Sports Law Worksin-Progress Conference for supplying helpful comments on earlier versions of
this Article.
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often overlooked solution: the creation of a federal sports regulatory
body. Because the U.S. professional sports leagues today effectively
operate as natural monopolies—with nearly 150 years of history
establishing that competing leagues cannot sustainably coexist in a
sport for any significant length of time—direct government
regulation of the industry is warranted. Indeed, a specialized
regulatory body would be particularly well suited to ensure that the
leagues’ activities are aligned with the public interest, while at the
same time accommodating the industry’s unusual economic
characteristics.
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I. Introduction
Four monopoly sports leagues currently dominate the U.S.
professional-team-sports industry.1 Because each of these leagues
enjoys unchallenged control over its respective sport at the highest
level of professional competition, each possesses significant market
power in what is estimated to be a $67 billion industry.2 While
1. The four monopoly leagues are the National Football League (NFL),
Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and
the National Hockey League (NHL). This Article focuses only on the legal
regulation of these four leagues and does not address the sufficiency of the
existing legal regulation of other professional sports leagues or those
professional sports (e.g., golf, tennis, auto racing, etc.) utilizing a “circuit”
structure in which “a single central body independently coordinates many
aspects of the sport.” See Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of
the Single Entity Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS.
L.J. 449, 498 (2011) [hereinafter Grow, American Needle]. This Article also does
not address the regulation of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA).
2. See Stefan Szymanski, What sports capitalism can teach us about real
world fair play, CNN (Jan. 24, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://edition.cnn.
com/2014/01/24/business/davos-sports-capitalism-real-world/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2015) (reporting that the estimated “market value of the four major leagues
(NFL, MLB, NBA, NHL) [is] $67 billion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
Some commentators have contested the extent of the leagues’ monopoly
market power, contending instead that the leagues simply constitute a few of
the many competitors operating in a larger “entertainment” marketplace. See,
e.g., Franklin M. Fisher et al., The Economics of Sports Leagues—The Chicago
Bulls Case, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 13 (1999) (asserting that “sports leagues
compete with other entertainment products”); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of
the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34 n.156
(1983) (“[T]his article posits that the relevant product market for NFL football is
the ‘entertainment’ market . . . .’”); Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of
Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary
Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 1013 n.253 (1988) [hereinafter Roberts,
Evolving Confusion] (contending that leagues do not have “substantial or
monopoly market power in a relevant product market”).
While this may be true to some extent, both courts and many economists
have determined that leagues operate in more narrowly defined relevant
markets and, thus, possess monopoly power over their respective sport. See, e.g.,
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 531–32 (7th Cir. 1986) (characterizing
NBA basketball as a separate market); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that there are
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federal antitrust law—the primary legal authority regulating
professional sports leagues in the United States3—would normally
be expected to provide a significant check on anticompetitive,
monopolistic behavior, it has failed to govern the industry
effectively due to the leagues’ well-entrenched monopoly status
and the high degree of coordination necessary among their
respective teams.4 Consequently, in many respects, each of the four
major U.S. professional sports leagues today effectively enjoys
unregulated monopoly status.5
As one might expect, the leagues use this unchecked power to
extract monopoly profits—or, in economics parlance, monopoly
rents6—from the public with little legal consequence. For example,
by restricting their rate of expansion, the leagues have created an
artificial shortage of teams, forcing cities to compete against one
another to attract and retain professional sports franchises.7
“limited substitutes from a consumer standpoint” for NFL football); Mid-South
Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“There
is no doubt that the NFL currently has a monopoly in the United States in
major league football.”); JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY FORT, HARD BALL: THE ABUSE OF
POWER IN PRO TEAM SPORTS 8 (1999) (discussing “the monopoly power of pro
team sports leagues”); Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition
in League Sports, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 625, 628 [hereinafter Ross & Szymanski,
Open Competition] (“All major sports are controlled by monopoly leagues.”).
Consequently, this Article proceeds on the assumption that each of the four
major U.S. professional sports leagues possesses monopoly power.
3. See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing antitrust law
in relation to professional sport regulation).
4. See infra Part II (discussing the limitations of antitrust regulation of
professional sports leagues); see also David Haddock, Tonja Jacobi & Matthew
Sag, League Structure & Stadium Rent-Seeking—the Role of Antitrust Revisited,
65 FLA. L. REV. 1, 45 (2013) (stating that “antitrust law fails to curb”
anticompetitive league conduct).
5. See infra Part II (explaining the failure of antitrust law to regulate
sports leagues).
6. An economic rent is defined as “a payment for services over and above
the incentive required for its production.” Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 14; see
also GERALD W. SCULLY, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF SPORTS 23 (1995)
(explaining that “[l]eague rules that define . . . conditions of entry . . . are not
necessary for the provision of games but exist in the interest of rent-seeking”).
7. See infra Part III.A (discussing the anticonsumer practices of sports
leagues in regards to stadium construction); see also Gabriel Feldman, The
Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for Sports Leagues: American
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Despite the questionable economic benefits these franchises impart
on their host communities,8 teams have nevertheless been able to
extract enormous subsidies from local governments—typically in
the form of new stadiums constructed at public expense—
estimated to cost taxpayers as much as $1 billion per year for just
the NFL alone.9 Meanwhile, the leagues have also extended their
monopoly power to the television broadcast market, eliminating
potential competition among their respective teams by collectively
negotiating all national television broadcast agreements on a
league-wide basis.10 As a result, the leagues are able to charge
networks higher prices for the right to televise their games, costs
that are eventually passed on to all television viewers—both sports
fans and non-fans alike—in the form of higher cable television
bills.11 Even then, fans may find themselves unable to watch their
favorite teams play on television or over the Internet due to the
imposition of various arcane and anticompetitive blackout rules
imposed by the leagues.12
This Article asserts that government regulation, ideally in the
form of a federal sports regulatory body, represents the only
practical means for curbing the anticompetitive behavior of the
monopoly sports leagues.13 Because the U.S. professional sports
Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a Flawed Defense, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 835, 885 [hereinafter Feldman, Puzzling Persistence] (“The scarcity
of teams may also give team owners significant leverage when negotiating
stadium deals with local governments.”); Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports
Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 650 (1989) [hereinafter Ross, Monopoly Sports]
(“Team owners use their significant advantage in bargaining power to extract
subsidies from local treasuries.”).
8. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (noting that the perceived
reputational benefits may not outweigh the economic costs of a stadium).
9. See Gregg Easterbrook, How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 18, 2003, 8:24 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015)
(estimating that “[a]nnualized, NFL stadium subsidies and tax favors add up to
perhaps $1 billion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing broadcasting licensing practices).
11. See infra notes 217–219 and accompanying text (exploring the
anticompetitive effects of leagues’ broadcasting licensing practices).
12. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing blackout restrictions).
13. See infra Part V (arguing that government regulation is needed).
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industry has, throughout its nearly 150-year history, consistently
gravitated towards monopoly control of each sport by a single
“major” league,14 alternative proposals employing free-market
mechanisms to curtail the leagues’ monopoly power are impractical
and unlikely to succeed.15 Indeed, sports leagues today effectively
operate as natural monopolies, warranting government regulation
of the industry.16
Moreover, direct federal regulation of the industry is
particularly justified not only insofar as Congress has itself
granted the leagues some of their monopoly power through the
enactment of various antitrust exemptions17 but also in light of the
fact that the public has repeatedly helped subsidize the industry
by providing billions of dollars in stadium funding.18 Indeed, in
many respects, the U.S. professional sports industry has become a
public trust, with sports franchises often deeply woven into the
social fabric of their host communities.19 While team owners are
14. See infra notes 291–304 and accompanying text (discussing the
monopolistic nature of sports leagues); see also John C. Weistart, League Control
of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in the
Sports Industry, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1070 (“The tendencies toward
monopolization are unmistakable in the various professional sports.”).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing alternative proposals to curb professional
sports leagues’ monopoly power).
16. See infra notes 291–304 and accompanying text (discussing the
development of natural monopolies among professional sports leagues). The
characterization of sports leagues as natural monopolies has been adopted by
various economists. See, e.g., Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of
Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1, 4 (1964) (concluding that “each professional
sport is a natural monopoly”); James Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team
Movements in Professional Sports, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 64 (1973)
(“Because the incentives for monopoly control are so strong, it is not possible to
rely on the market to regulate activities in the professional sports industries—
competitive leagues simply will not and have not survived.”).
17. See infra notes 332–334 and accompanying text (discussing how
congressional regulation contributed to the development of league monopolies).
18. See Easterbrook, supra note 9 (detailing numerous examples of the
NFL receiving major subsidies from cities and from taxpayers that “add up to
perhaps $1 billion” per year).
19. See Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey, Introduction to GOVERNMENT
AND SPORT 2 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey eds., 1985) (declaring that
“sport has acquired the status of a public trust”).
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quick to highlight this relationship when seeking new stadiums,20
the time has come for the public to take the necessary steps to
ensure that the sports industry no longer abuses that bond.21
This Article therefore advances the case for the direct federal
regulation of the professional sports industry. The Article proceeds
in four parts. Part II asserts the normative claim that federal
antitrust law is often unable to effectively regulate professional
sports leagues due to their unique economic characteristics. Part
III documents the ways that sports leagues abuse their unchecked
monopoly power to the public’s detriment. Part IV discusses
alternative scholarly proposals to curtail the sports leagues’
anticompetitive practices, concluding that neither divestiture nor
the imposition of a promotion and relegation system offers a
feasible solution to the problems posed by the monopoly leagues.22
Finally, Part V proposes an intuitive, but surprisingly often
overlooked, solution to the harm caused by the U.S. professional
sports industry: the creation of a federal sports regulatory body to
govern the monopoly sports leagues.23 This analysis thus offers an
original yet pragmatic contribution to the existing legal literature,
proposing a means through which to ensure that professional
sports leagues do not harm the public interest in the future while
at the same time imposing minimal disruption to an industry
closely followed and enjoyed by millions of Americans.24

20. See Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic
Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1065 (1996) (stating that team owners
frequently claim public trust status when “seeking public financing for new
stadiums”).
21. See infra Part V (advocating for legislative measures to curb abuses by
sports leagues).
22. See infra Part IV (discussing various proposals to combat professional
sports monopolies).
23. See infra Part V (arguing for the creation of a federal agency to regulate
professional sports leagues’ anticompetitive behavior).
24. See infra Part V (explaining that government regulation need not be
heavy-handed or burdensome).
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II. Antitrust Law Cannot Effectively Regulate Professional Sports
Leagues
Federal antitrust law is the primary legal authority regulating
the operation of professional sports leagues in the United States.25
While the NFL,26 NBA,27 and NHL28 have each been subject to the
Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act)29 for the better part of sixty
years, professional baseball has notoriously been exempt from
federal antitrust law since 1922, when the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that its operations did not constitute interstate commerce.30
Nevertheless, in most respects MLB structures its operations
consistent with that of the other professional leagues. Indeed, MLB
has often voluntarily abided by the Sherman Act to avoid drawing
the ire of Congress and risk the revocation of its exemption,31
occasionally even going so far as to refrain from asserting its
exemption at all in some lawsuits—such as those relating to its
trademark licensing activities—and choosing instead to defend
25. See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of
professional sports under antitrust law).
26. See Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 448 (1957)
(concluding that the NFL’s “activities as alleged are within the coverage of the
antitrust laws”).
27. See Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971)
(stating that the NBA “does not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws”).
28. See, e.g., Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (concluding that “the National Hockey
League is subject to the operations of the antitrust laws”).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
30. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208
(1922) (determining that MLB’s business “is giving exhibitions of base ball,
which are purely state affairs”). The Supreme Court has subsequently affirmed
baseball’s unusual antitrust status on two occasions. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (“[W]hat the court said in Federal Baseball in 1922 and
what it said in Toolson in 1953, we say again here in 1972 . . . .”); Toolson v.
N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (“Without reexamination of the
underlying issues, the [judgment] below [is] affirmed on the authority of Federal
Baseball . . . .”).
31. See Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 211, 260 (2012) [hereinafter Grow, In Defense of] (“Recognizing
that it must maintain political goodwill with Congress to keep its exemption,
MLB has regularly agreed to modify its practices in response to congressional
pressure.”).
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itself on the merits of the antitrust challenge.32 Consequently,
because MLB has acted in many respects as if it were subject to
the Sherman Act,33 federal antitrust law governs, directly or
indirectly, all four major U.S. professional sports leagues.
Unfortunately, despite society’s reliance on the Sherman Act
to regulate the professional sports industry, antitrust law has
failed to effectively govern the monopoly sports leagues.34 Indeed,
the Sherman Act is poorly suited to regulating these entities due to
their unique characteristics and “peculiar economics.”35 Because
the individual teams in a league must work closely together to
coordinate their competitive athletic events, courts have struggled
to apply section 1’s anticollusion restrictions in a consistent and
coherent manner to curtail the leagues’ anticompetitive practices.36
Meanwhile, because the leagues also enjoy a well-entrenched
monopoly status—due to the significant barriers to entry that exist
in the industry—the antimonopolization restrictions in section 2 of
the Act have likewise failed to curb the leagues’ abuse of their
monopoly power.37

32. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d
290, 296 (2d Cir. 2008) (demonstrating MLB asserting “that its conduct did not
violate the Sherman Act”).
33. Cf. Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 215 (concluding that “MLB’s
operations are nearly identical to the other leagues in most significant respects
despite its antitrust immunity”).
34. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of
Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 892 (1999) [hereinafter Piraino, A
Proposal] (declaring that courts have failed to “effectively regulat[e] the leagues’
abuses of monopoly power”).
35. Neale, supra note 16; see Steven R. Rivkin, Sports Leagues and the
Federal Antitrust Laws, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, 387, 387
(Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) (“Applying the antitrust laws to professional sports,
like any attempt to push a square peg through a round hole, is bound to be
troublesome.”).
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infra Part II.B.
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A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act

The activities of the U.S. professional sports leagues have
most frequently been scrutinized under section 1 of the Sherman
Act,38 which declares “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . to be illegal.”39
Although a literal interpretation of section 1 would potentially
outlaw any agreement limiting trade, courts have historically
interpreted the provision to only forbid “unreasonable” restraints,
namely those whose anticompetitive effects outweigh their
procompetitive benefits.40 Meanwhile, because any “contract,
combination . . . or
conspiracy”
inherently
requires
the
participation of two or more parties, a single firm acting alone
cannot infringe section 1.41 Instead, the unilateral conduct of a
single entity is subject only to the antimonopolization provision in
section 2.42
The leagues initially contested the applicability of section 1 to
their activities by asserting that each league was, in effect, a single
economic actor producing a solitary product, such as “NFL football”
or “NBA basketball.”43 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this so38. See, e.g., Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement”
Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 403, 412 (2009) (“The main section of U.S. antitrust law
applicable to U.S. sports leagues is Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
40. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 886 (2007) (explaining that antitrust law “distinguishes between restraints
with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints
stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest”); cf. Gabriel A.
Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of
Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 561, 570 (2009) [hereinafter Feldman,
Misuse] (describing the emerging analysis as finding a practice unreasonable if
there is a less restrictive alternative available).
41. See, e.g., Brian Winrow & Kevin Johnson, The Rule of Law Is the Rule
of Reason, 84 N.D. L. REV. 59, 64 (2008) (“In order for a restraint to violate
Section One of the Sherman Act, there must be an agreement between at least
two parties.”).
42. See, e.g., Grow, American Needle, supra note 1, at 449 (discussing
same).
43. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d
593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he NBA submits [that] it function[s] as a single
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called “single entity” defense in the 2010 case of American Needle
v. National Football League,44 however, holding that section 1
applied to the NFL’s joint trademark licensing activities.45 Because
the logic of the American Needle decision would appear to extend
to most other league activities, practically all league conduct is
now subject to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act.46
The urge for courts to apply section 1 to the professional sports
industry is quite understandable as the leagues’ existing form of
industrial organization is ripe for potential anticompetitive
abuse.47 Indeed, most significant league decisions require the
approval of a majority or super-majority of the league’s thirty to
thirty-two independently owned and operated teams.48 The
individual profit motives of these teams may, in some cases,
motivate them to make economically inefficient decisions on behalf
of the league, decisions that injure the public interest.49
entity . . . .”); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1094 (1st Cir.
1994) (addressing the NFL’s argument that it “function[s] as a single
enterprise”); Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07-CV8455, 2007 WL 3254421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (exploring the
organizational structure of the NHL).
44. 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
45. See id. at 196 (“The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary
decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic power
characteristic of independent action.”).
46. See Grow, American Needle, supra note 1, at 496 (concluding that
“[g]iven the scope of the Supreme Court’s ruling [in American Needle], it will be
difficult for the NFL to assert that it constitutes a single entity in any
significant respect in the future”).
47. Cf. N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257
(2d Cir. 1982) (asserting that allowing the leagues to avoid the application of
section 1 “would permit league members to escape antitrust responsibility”).
48. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationale for the Expansion
of Professional Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1677 (1996) [hereinafter
Piraino, Antitrust Rationale] (stating that the four monopoly sports leagues each
employ “super majority voting requirements in the leagues’ bylaws”).
49. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
AND THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 84 (1997) (noting that “[t]eam interests often
conflict with the collective welfare of a league”); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues
and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on
Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 258–59 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts,
Sports Leagues] (finding that “the individual [teams’] economic interests
sometimes conflict with the league’s interests as a whole”); Ross, Monopoly
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Take, for example, the case of league expansion. Unless a
proposed increase in the number of franchises in a league is
expected to enlarge each existing team’s share of league revenues,
the expansion will typically be rejected even if it would increase
league revenues overall.50 For instance, assume that the thirty-two
NFL teams each evenly split $4 billion in annual revenues,
generating $125 million per team.51 Even if a proposed two-team
expansion were expected to increase the league’s revenues by $100
million per year, to $4.1 billion, the league would nevertheless
reject it because it would actually result in each individual team’s
share of the proceeds declining by $5 million, to around $120
million per year.52 Consequently, given the decision-making
structure employed by the four U.S. professional sports leagues,
economically efficient proposals will be rejected even though they
would maximize total league revenues and therefore enhance
consumer welfare.53
There would be little need for courts to regulate the internal
decision-making processes of the leagues under section 1 if each of
the four major professional sports were subject to a truly
competitive market, with multiple competing leagues challenging
each other for supremacy.54 In a competitive marketplace, even if
Sports, supra note 7, at 698 (declaring that “[o]wners of teams in monopoly
sports leagues . . . have substantial room to engage in inefficient behavior”).
50. See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive
Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 133, 139 (2001) [hereinafter Ross, Antitrust Options] (noting
that a league “will only expand as long as average revenue” is increased).
51. This example is borrowed from Professor Gabriel Feldman, Puzzling
Persistence, supra note 7, at 885.
52. Id.
53. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient
Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and
Less Like the United Nations¸ 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213, 226 (2006)
[hereinafter Ross & Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient] (“A club-run
league . . . will not expand unless a super-majority of clubs are compensated for
any lost revenue, even though the league as a whole might benefit from
expansion.”).
54. See PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN
MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS 329 (2000) (stating that in a competitive
landscape sports leagues would face fewer legal challenges under antitrust law
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one league were to engage in an inefficient economic practice, it
would nevertheless have little adverse impact on the public
because the league would quickly lose market share to one of its
more efficiently structured rivals.55 However, because the four
major U.S. sports are not subject to typical market forces but
instead are controlled by monopolies operating largely outside the
scope of section 2 of the Sherman Act,56 courts have been forced to
apply section 1 to the league’s internal governance decisions.57
Otherwise, the monopoly sports leagues would be left to operate
free from any significant regulatory oversight.58 Thus, internal
business decisions that would, in most other industries, be judged
only under section 2 are instead analyzed under the much broader
section 1 when made by professional sports leagues.59
While the instinct to subject sports leagues to scrutiny under
section 1 is thus understandable, the provision has nevertheless
proven difficult to apply coherently to the industry due to its

“because a competitive external market is the best judge on that score”).
55. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: ReExamining the Threshold Questions, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 986 (1988) (declaring
that “interbrand competition” between competing firms typically “offset[s] the
anticompetitive effects of any significant intrabrand restraints” in most
industries).
56. See infra Part II.B (explaining the general inapplicability of section 2 of
the Sherman Act to the U.S. monopoly sports leagues).
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
courts have applied section 1 to internal decisions by sports leagues despite
their assertion of single-entity defenses).
58. See Edelman & Doyle, supra note 38, at 412 (“The main section of U.S.
antitrust law applicable to U.S. sports leagues is Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.”).
59. See Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements
and Antitrust’s Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773, 1778
(1999) (“Because a single firm can engage in anticompetitive conduct so long as
it does not threaten monopolization, activity that (if concerted) would be illegal
under Section One, is permitted under Section Two (if it is unilateral).”);
Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 49, at 269 (“Sports leagues are the only type
of business enterprise whose every internal management decision is subject to
Section 1 judicial review.”). Section 1 is considered to be a broader provision
because it subjects any agreement among multiple firms, and not just those that
threaten monopolization of an industry, to scrutiny.
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unique economic characteristics.60 Indeed, economists have long
recognized that professional sports leagues operate under an
unusual or “peculiar” economic model.61 Specifically, professional
sports teams produce a product—competitive sporting events—
that inherently and uniquely cannot be produced by a single firm
acting alone.62 Unlike any other industry, competitive athletic
contests depend on the interaction of two different, independently
operated teams to create a marketable product.63 A game staged by
a single team acting alone—such as an intra-squad scrimmage—
60. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports’ Bargaining
Power Vis-à-vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280, 284 (2003)
[hereinafter Edelman, How to Curb] (“The unique structure of the professional
sports market . . . renders traditional antitrust scrutiny inadequate.”); Piraino,
A Proposal, supra note 34, at 892 (“The federal courts’ failure to develop a
consistent theory regarding the economic behavior of sports leagues has
prevented them from effectively regulating the leagues’ abuses of monopoly
power.”).
61. See Neale, supra note 16, at 1 (positing that teams in professional
sports are in a “peculiar” economic position compared with traditional business
entities); Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726, 740 (2010) (“As many have observed,
the NFL and similarly designed professional sports leagues are unique
creatures without clear parallels in the market of goods and services.”).
62. See, e.g., PAUL DOWNWARD & ALISTAIR DAWSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 20 (2000) (contending that “in team sports . . . no
team can produce saleable output by itself”); Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra
note 49, at 227 (asserting that “a sports team . . . is metaphysically incapable of
producing its product” by itself).
63. See, e.g., Grow, American Needle, supra note 1, at 466 (explaining that
“staging a competitive professional sporting event inherently requires the
participation of two different teams”).
Some commentators have contested the uniqueness of the sports industry by
comparing the leagues to so-called “network joint ventures,” or in other words,
those “that operat[e] in an area where joint production or distribution is said to
be necessary before the product can even exist, at least in the form offered by
the joint venture.” Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10; see Feldman, Puzzling Persistence, supra
note 7, at 861 n.167 (analogizing sports leagues to network joint ventures). The
production of a competitive sporting event is not directly analogous to a network
joint venture, however, because unlike the sporting event, the typical network
joint venture simply creates a more robust version of a product or service
already available on a local basis from a single provider acting alone (such as
the long-distance telephone system). See Grow, American Needle, supra note 1,
at 488 (arguing the same).
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would lack the “competitive intensity” that “consumers have come
to expect and demand.”64 Meanwhile, an entire league of teams is
necessary to provide a complete season of competition
culminating in the crowning of an overall league champion.65 To
create these products, the teams in a league must not only
physically interact on the playing field but also agree to a playing
schedule and a common set of rules governing their interaction.66
This unique level of interdependence among the teams in a
league makes them atypical economic competitors.67 Whereas in
most industries competing firms usually would be eager to drive
their rivals out of business to seize a larger share of the market
for themselves, franchises in a professional sports league depend
on the continued economic viability of their competitors for their
own survival.68 If a single team were to become so successful that
it eventually drove its rivals out of business, it would have no one
left to play against, assuring its own demise. Therefore, while
teams may have a short-term economic incentive to dominate
their competition both on and off the playing field, they
nevertheless recognize that sustained competitive dominance by
any single franchise is not in their own long-term best interest.69
64. Grow, American Needle, supra note 1, at 487; see Roberts, Sports
Leagues, supra note 49, at 229 (finding that a series of unconnected exhibition
games between barnstorming teams “would yield a substantially different, and
far less valuable, entertainment product than that developed today by the
modern sports league”).
65. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 2, at 5 (“Even two teams, or a small
number of teams, cannot create the product that is produced by a sports league.
That product is a series of games in the context of a league season.”).
66. See, e.g., McCann, supra note 61, at 730 (noting that “[NFL] teams
must . . . collaborate . . . on game rules”).
67. See Brown v. Prof’l Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996) (“[T]he clubs
that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent
economic competitors, as they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic
survival.”).
68. See DOWNWARD & DAWSON, supra note 62, at 20 (noting that while
“teams prefer to beat their rivals . . . they cannot aim at a monopoly of sporting
success, as they need to play successful teams”).
69. See id. at 21 (explaining that “[d]omination of a league by a single club
would reduce public interest in the sport” with the result that “[i]n the long run
even the dominant team suffers”).

588

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573 (2015)

Indeed, if a league’s results become too predictable—on either an
individual game basis or with respect to the season-long
competition for the league championship—then public interest
will inevitably wane, reducing the profitability of the entire
enterprise.70 In this sense, economic success in the professional
sports industry is not a zero-sum game; if one team were to seize
too large a share of league revenues, the size of the entire pie will
shrink.71 Thus, teams recognize that they must often temper their
individual, short-term economic interests to best advance the
long-term welfare of the entire league.72
Recognizing their unusual economic reality, professional
sports leagues have designed an elaborate framework to balance
their need to encourage teams to compete vigorously on the
playing field, while at the same time ensuring that a sufficient
level of competitive balance exists within the sport to create the
most marketable and commercially successful product possible.73
On the one hand, leagues must provide teams with sufficient
individual economic incentive to ensure that they will maximize
the profits available in their local market, thus increasing the
entire league’s revenues.74 On the other hand, leagues must also
70. See Yang-Ming Chang & Shane Sanders, Pool Revenue Sharing, Team
Investments and Competitive Balance in Professional Sports: A Theoretical
Analysis, 10 J. SPORTS ECON. 409, 409 (2009) (“[A] sporting competition is more
entertaining and of higher quality when the game’s outcome is more
unpredictable.”).
71. See id. at 418 (explaining that smaller market teams may not be able to
compete due to low revenues that do “not allow them [to] hir[e] talented players
hired by larger market teams”).
72. This is not to suggest that sports teams’ economic interests are always
perfectly aligned. As noted above, teams may place their own individual selfinterests over that of the league in some cases, such as league expansion. See
supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive of each
individual team to vote against league expansion if such expansion would
reduce the team’s share of league-wide revenues). Nevertheless, professional
sports teams are not true competitors in the classic economic sense as their
shared profit motive will usually outweigh any competing individual economic
interests over the long run.
73. See Chang & Sanders, supra note 70, at 409 (“[A] sporting competition
is more entertaining and of higher quality when the game’s outcome is more
unpredictable.”).
74. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 310 (noting that “[e]xcessive revenue
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impose various restraints on team behavior to maintain
competitive balance throughout the league.75 For example,
leagues typically restrict the number of players that teams can
employ at any given time, as well as the amount that they spend
on player salaries, to ensure that they compete on the playing
field on a roughly equivalent basis.76 Similarly, leagues impose
restrictions on who may own their franchises, in part, to
guarantee that teams do not fall into the hands of
undercapitalized or unqualified owners who could ruin the
competitive standing of the franchise.77
In light of these unusual economic characteristics, courts
have struggled to consistently and coherently apply section 1 to
professional sports leagues.78 Recognizing that teams must
coordinate their activities to produce competitive athletic events,
courts have traditionally held that league restraints are not
subject to automatic, per se condemnation under section 1.79
sharing may not only deter [teams] from competing in the national market but
also reduce the incentive of franchise owners to make their teams more
attractive in their home markets—both on and off the field”).
75. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Player Restraints and Competition Law
Throughout the World, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 49, 55 (2004) [hereinafter Ross,
Player Restraints] (“What makes sports leagues unique is the recognition of the
legitimate interest that clubs have in competitive balance, an interest that can
justify restraints impermissible in other industries.”).
76. See Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional
Sports: Balancing the Scales After Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1268 (2012) [hereinafter Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor]
(“Teams must also agree . . . on rules regarding roster limits, player salaries,
player movement, and other player restraints.”). MLB is unique among the four
major U.S. sports leagues insofar as it does not employ a salary cap but instead
utilizes a luxury tax system. See Kimberly A. Colmey, Comment, Unnecessary
Roughness: Why the NFL Should Not Be Flagged for Antitrust Scrutiny in Labor
Relations, 5 J. MARSHALL L.J. 231, 258 (2011) (noting the difference between the
two systems).
77. See Jorge E. Leal Garrett & Bryan A. Green, Considerations for
Professional Sports Teams Contemplating Going Public, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69,
81 (2010) (noting that “professional sports team league policies often impose
ownership and control restrictions”).
78. See, e.g., Feldman, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 843 (“Courts
have long struggled to coherently apply the antitrust laws to sports leagues.”).
79. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203
(2010) (holding that per se condemnation of sports league restraints is
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Instead, they typically apply the so-called “rule of reason” to
league activity, weighing the procompetitive benefits of a
challenged restraint against its anticompetitive effects.80 In doing
so, courts acknowledge that some otherwise anticompetitive
restraints may be necessary to encourage competitive balance
among the league’s teams and thus ultimately ensure the
organization’s long-term viability.81
Nevertheless, courts applying the rule of reason to
professional sports leagues have been forced to make extremely
difficult and subjective decisions regarding the competitive effects
of a particular challenged practice.82 Indeed, because most league
policies will invariably have some impact on competitive
balance—and thus the quality of the league’s product as a
whole—courts are frequently forced to consider whether a
particular restraint’s beneficial impact on league-wide
competitiveness justifies its anticompetitive effect in a related
market. For example, the decision by a league to collectively
license its trademarks for merchandising purposes may help
further its competitive balance interests by equalizing licensing
unjustified because “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to
be available at all”); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 503–04 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that per se scrutiny is not
appropriate in professional hockey).
80. See, e.g., McCann, supra note 61, at 737 (finding that “[c]ourts have
repeatedly adopted rule of reason for scrutinizing restraints imposed by
professional sports leagues”); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Law and
Economic Theory: Finding a Balance, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 131 (2013) (“In
short, under the rule of reason, a court must weigh procompetitive benefits
against anticompetitive effects and determine, on balance, whether particular
conduct restrains trade.”).
81. See SCULLY, supra note 6, at 4 (describing sports leagues as being
“unique in the range of anticompetitive practices tolerated” by courts); Ross
Siler, Comment, The Lesson of the 2011 NFL and NBA Lockouts: Why Courts
Should Not Immediately Recognize Players’ Union Disclaimers of
Representation, 88 WASH. L. REV. 281, 290 (2013) (“Courts recognize that some
anti-competitive restraints are acceptable to foster competitive balance in a
league.”).
82. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 45–46 (declaring that “[a]ntitrust
law’s failure [to regulate sports leagues] is grounded in the necessity of some
forms of cooperation in a sports league, obscuring the boundary between
legitimate and illegitimate collusion among franchises”).
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revenue across the league.83 At the same time, however, such
collective action reduces competition in the market for league
trademark licenses, thereby presumably increasing the price that
licensees (and ultimately consumers) must pay.84 Attempting to
decide whether the procompetitive benefits of such an activity
outweigh its anticompetitive effects brings to mind Justice
Scalia’s oft-quoted criticism of the rule of reason, declaring it to
be the equivalent of “judging whether a particular line is longer
than a particular rock is heavy.”85
Indeed, the rule of reason is particularly ill-suited to appraise
the competitive effects of a single restraint that operates as one
piece of a much larger framework.86 Because only a single league
practice will typically be at issue in a given lawsuit, courts may
not fully appreciate the significance of the challenged restraint
within the league’s greater operational structure.87 Viewed in
isolation, most individual rules will appear to play a rather
inconsequential role within a league’s overall balancing of
economic and competitive interests, and as a result, courts may
underestimate the procompetitive benefits of a particular
restraint when evaluating it under the rule of reason.88 Such an
83. Admittedly, leagues could accomplish much the same result by allowing
teams to license their trademarks individually and then splitting all revenue
equally.
84. See Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap to American Needle and
Beyond: Antitrust Law’s Limited Capacity to Stitch Consumer Harm from
Professional Sports Club Trademark Monopolies, 86 TUL. L. REV. 901, 930 (2012)
(explaining that “collective exclusive product licensing . . . eliminates economic
competition . . . and likely increases retail prices to the detriment of consumer
welfare”).
85. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
86. Cf. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)
(recognizing that “[j]udges often lack the expert understanding of industrial
market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice’s
effect on competition”); see also Weistart, supra note 14, at 1067 (“The rule of
reason invites a type of inquiry that courts have had difficulty making
accurately and efficiently in the sports industry.”).
87. See Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 49, at 293 (explaining that “as
a practical matter, courts and juries are not well equipped to determine what is
in a league’s interests”).
88. This problem is particularly acute in cases when a rule is
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approach risks exposing leagues to a “death by a thousand cuts”
as courts strike down various rules on a piecemeal basis without
fully appreciating how they fit into the larger framework, thus
ultimately undermining the league’s competitive balance
efforts.89
This problem is only magnified when courts apply the third
step of a typical rule-of-reason analysis and inquire into potential
less-restrictive alternatives to the challenged restraint.90 Under
this prong of the rule of reason, even if a court determines that a
practice’s procompetitive benefits outweigh its anticompetitive
effects, it will nevertheless strike down the restraint if its
beneficial aspects could have been obtained in a less harmful
way.91 Because any single sports-league restraint may have only
a modest impact on competitive balance, courts will frequently be
inclined to strike down the challenged practice on the grounds
that its particular terms are not essential.
For example, in the 1976 case of Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.,92
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the NFL’s then-seventeen-round draft violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act.93 The draft assigned teams the exclusive
“procompetitive when viewed on an ex ante basis, but [may be]
inefficient . . . when considered from an ex post vantage point.” Michael A. Flynn
& Richard J. Gilbert, The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint
Ventures, 111 ECON. J. F27, F45 (2001).
89. See Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 49, at 293 (explaining that “as
a practical matter, courts and juries are not well equipped to determine what is
in a league’s interest”).
90. See Gary R. Roberts, The Legality of the Exclusive Collective Sale of
Intellectual Property Rights by Sports Leagues, 3 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 52, 73 (2001)
[hereinafter Roberts, Legality] (describing the less restrictive alternatives stage
of the rule of reason as being “so ill-defined and analytically problematic that it
makes analyzing or predicting individual cases very difficult, if not impossible”).
91. See Feldman, Misuse, supra note 40, at 563 (describing the analysis as
holding that “a restraint that achieves a net pro-competitive impact . . . is illegal
if that impact could have been attained by a less restrictive alternative”).
92. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
93. See id. at 744 (“[T]he Court can only conclude that plaintiff’s contention
must prevail, and accordingly holds that the NFL draft in which plaintiff was
selected violates the Sherman and Clayton Acts per se . . . .”). Today, the NFL
draft is immunized from antitrust law under the so-called nonstatutory labor
exemption, insofar as the players’ union has agreed to it and incorporated it into
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bargaining rights to players in the reverse order of where they
finished in the most recent league standings (in other words, the
worst team in the league received the first pick in each round
while the league champion received the last pick).94 James
“Yazoo” Smith, a former NFL player, challenged this practice
under antitrust law, contending that, but for the draft, NFL
teams would have been forced to bid against one another for the
right to sign him, thereby increasing his eventual salary.95
Applying a less-restrictive-alternative analysis to the draft, the
district court determined that the practice violated the rule of
reason insofar as the NFL could have designed a draft with fewer
rounds, thereby burdening fewer players while still protecting the
league’s competitive balance interests.96
The problem with such an analysis is that one can almost
always devise some hypothetical less-restrictive alternative to the
challenged restraint. For example, if so inclined, a court could
conclude that reducing the length of a draft from seventeen to
twelve rounds, or from eight rounds to five, would be unlikely to
have a significant impact on competitive balance, thereby making
the existing draft an unlawful restraint of trade.97 But that does
the league’s collective bargaining agreement. Cf. Clarett v. Nat’l Football
League, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the NFL’s draft eligibility
restrictions are protected under the nonstatutory labor exemption).
94. See Ross, Player Restraints, supra note 75, at 50 (“Common among
North American and Australian leagues is a player draft, whereby amateurs or
veterans not under contract can only negotiate with the team that selects them;
teams usually select in reverse order of finish from the prior season.”).
95. See Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 740–41 (explaining Smith’s contention that
the draft was a group boycott that prevented him from acquiring a contract at
the actual market value of his services).
96. See id. at 747 (“Since there are presently seventeen rounds in the draft,
with twenty-eight teams picking in each round, a reduction of fifteen rounds
would obviously be significantly less restriction on competition than the present
system.”).
97. See Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market:
The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 381 (1986) (noting “the
obvious observation that . . . any type of draft deviating from the free market
norm would be fatally flawed, even though it might serve ‘to regulate and
promote . . . competition,’ because it would never be the least restrictive system
possible”).
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not necessarily mean that the restraint was actually overly
restrictive as it may have played an important role within the
league’s larger competitive balance framework, serving to offset
teams’ greater allotted freedom in another realm of their
operations.98 For example, a league might decide that, by
increasing the number of rounds in its draft and thereby making
a greater number of entry-level players subject to the process, it
can afford to place fewer restraints on veteran players’ free
agency rights while continuing to ensure that sufficient
competitive balance exists among its teams. If a court were to
shorten the league’s draft under the rule of reason, however, then
the league’s delicate balancing of its competitive interests would
be disrupted.
That is not to say that every league restraint is necessary to
maintain competitive balance. Indeed, leagues can—and, as will
be seen in Part III, often do—engage in anticompetitive practices
that, on balance, injure the public welfare.99 Moreover, many of
these same criticisms can be levied against the rule of reason
generally, and not just as it is applied to the professional sports
industry.100 However, the shortcomings of the rule of reason have
a more pervasive effect on professional sports leagues than most
other industries. Because a sports league will almost always act
through the collective decision making of thirty-plus teams,101
practically every significant decision it renders will be subject to
challenge under section 1, thus exposing the league’s entire
operational framework to the vagaries of the rule of reason.102

98. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties
courts face when analyzing a single restraint that may serve a greater role in a
league’s operational structure).
99. See infra Part III (describing the ways sports leagues abuse their
unchecked monopoly power to the public’s detriment).
100. See Feldman, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 898 (“There is little
question that the rule of reason is an imperfect method for determining the
legality of restraints.”).
101. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that most
significant league decisions require approval).
102. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (contending that the rule
of reason requires subjective decision making by courts).
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While the extent to which one is troubled by the potential
breadth of a sports league’s exposure to antitrust law will vary,
leagues have undoubtedly been subjected to a haphazard
application of section 1.103 Occasionally, courts have applied
section 1 to strike down injurious league conduct.104 More often,
however, judges have applied the provision to league restraints
that have, at best, an attenuated and inconsequential impact on
consumer welfare (the maximization of which serves as the
guiding principle underlying federal antitrust law),105 while in
other cases failing to use the Sherman Act to rein in more
egregious conduct inflicting substantial harm on the public.106
For example, one source of relatively frequent but
nevertheless questionable section 1 litigation has come when a
self-interested team owner challenges league-wide policies. In
these cases, owners contest the legality of rules that they either
voted on themselves or that they implicitly consented to when

103. See Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy:
The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 20
(1986) (noting the existence of “[h]aphazard and inconsistent decisions applying
Section 1 of the Sherman Act to league governance rules and practices”); see also
Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor, supra note 76, at 1277 (“[C]omplaints about
the incoherence of the Rule of Reason are not wholly without merit; the Rule of
Reason has devolved from an imperfect test to an incoherent one.”).
104. For example, in one of the earliest reported sports league antitrust
cases, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania struck
down several anticompetitive television blackout rules adopted by the NFL. See
United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
see also infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasoning
of United States v. National Football League). Nevertheless, the application of
section 1 to sports leagues has been both over- and under-inclusive with respect
to the leagues’ allegedly anticompetitive behavior, thus failing to adequately
protect the public interest.
105. See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Monopsony and the Meaning of “Consumer
Welfare”: A Closer Look at Weyerhaeuser, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 353, 353
(“Courts and federal law enforcement officials routinely invoke ‘consumer
welfare’ as the guiding principle behind their application of the antitrust laws.”).
Meanwhile, for examples of sports league antitrust cases with an
inconsequential effect on consumer welfare, see infra notes 107–109 and
accompanying text.
106. See infra Part III (arguing that nefarious motivations underlie leagues’
resistance to adding more franchises).
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acquiring a franchise in the league.107 These owners effectively
seek judicial sanction to have their cake and eat it too, hoping to
challenge any restraint that is not in their current self-interest
while continuing to abide by those league rules that they find
beneficial. Courts have been surprisingly amenable to such
claims, using section 1 to strike down various league
restrictions.108 These cases will typically have only a minor
impact on the public interest, instead predominantly determining
how a group of billionaire owners divide their ever-growing
league revenues.109 As a result, courts are put in the position of
adjudicating the types of internal business disputes that are
usually resolved within a single firm itself, requiring judges to
substitute their own business judgment for that of the league as a
whole.110
Perhaps more troubling, though, is the fact that at other
times courts have been either unwilling or unable to use section 1
to deter the leagues from engaging in anticompetitive conduct far
more injurious to the public interest. Indeed, as will be discussed
in Part III, both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have failed
to curb sports leagues from using their monopoly power to harm
consumer welfare in several significant respects.111
107. See Nicolas Saenz, Note, Sports Franchise Bankruptcy: A New Way for
Team Owners to Escape League Control?, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63, 66
(2010) (“[T]eam owners have agreed to give up some autonomy to be part of an
‘efficiency-creating economic organization’ known as a sports league.”); Weistart,
supra note 14, at 1043 (stating that when an owner “accepted his franchise, he
accepted an array of risks and limitations”).
108. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099–101 (1st
Cir. 1994) (banning public ownership of teams violates section 1); N. Am. Soccer
League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1982) (banning
ownership of an interest in a competing league violates section 1).
109. Cf. Roberts, Evolving Confusion, supra note 2, at 985 (“[T]he lawfulness
of a sports league practice should be judged on whether the practice on balance
enhances or retards consumer welfare. It is of no relevance that challenged
conduct may adversely affect an individual team . . . .”).
110. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 734 (“Judicial
intervention . . . often puts the court in the role of sports regulator, for which the
judge . . . is ill-suited.”).
111. See infra Part III (describing anticompetitive league under-expansion,
broadcasting practices, and blackout polices, which are difficult to combat using
the Sherman Act); see also Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 45 (noting that,
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B. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Despite the judiciary’s inconsistent application of section 1 to
the sports industry, one might anticipate that the antimonopoly
provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act would be well suited to
protect the public from the four major U.S. monopoly sports
leagues. However, not all monopolies are automatically illegal
under section 2.112 Instead, only those monopolies that acquire or
maintain their dominant position through so-called exclusionary
practices (i.e., conduct intended to destroy or prevent a rival from
entering the market) violate the law.113 The theory behind this
framework is that so long as new rivals are free to enter the
market to challenge a monopolist’s dominant position, then
marketplace forces will alleviate any potential harm inflicted by
the monopoly.114 Put differently, if a monopoly firm is not
satisfying public demand in a competitive market then, absent
any barriers to entry, a rival firm will enter the field and chip
away at the dominant firm’s market share by providing
consumers with a superior (or cheaper) product.115 Otherwise, an
unchallenged monopoly can be expected to “reduce its output

although “leagues are classic cartels in many senses, they have suffered few
adverse antitrust decisions of any sort”).
112. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133,
135 (2008) (“Section Two of the Sherman Act does not condemn all monopolies,
only those achieved or maintained through anticompetitive or predatory
conduct.”).
113. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as
Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 813, 819 (2011) (“The monopolization offense
of Section Two of the Sherman Act requires a dominant firm and an
‘exclusionary’ practice, which is a practice that destroys a rival or keeps rivals
out of the market, permitting the monopolist to raise its price to monopoly
levels.”).
114. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 130 (noting that “in most other
industries, when a monopoly develops and the monopolizing firm begins to make
big profits or fails to respond adequately to its customers’ demands, competitors
enter into the industry”).
115. See id. (“The firms entering the industry provide lower-priced, more
consumer-friendly substitutes for the monopoly firm’s products, eating into its
market and eroding its profits.”).
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and/or artificially inflate its prices, to the detriment of
consumers.”116
While this framework has generally proven sufficient for
most industries, it has been less effective at curbing the
anticompetitive conduct of monopoly sports leagues.117
Specifically, because each league enjoys well-entrenched
monopoly power over its sport, section 2 will only provide a check
on the leagues should they engage in some type of exclusionary
conduct preventing a rival from entering the field.118 No such
rival has emerged to legitimately challenge the existing leagues
in over thirty years, however, due to the nearly insurmountable
barriers to entry existing in the industry.119 Indeed, any new
entrant seeking to compete with an existing league would
immediately be forced to overcome several significant hurdles.120
First, the existing leagues have a tremendous advantage
insofar as they have developed loyal, vociferous fan bases in
nearly every major city in the United States.121 On the relatively
116. Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 217; see Ross, Monopoly Sports,
supra note 7, at 645 (“Economic theories underlying the federal antitrust
statutes suggest that monopolies result in higher prices, lower output, and a
transfer of wealth from consumers to the producer/monopolist.”).
117. See Piraino, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 892 (stating that courts have
been unable to “effectively regulat[e] the leagues’ abuses of monopoly power”).
118. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text (explaining
exclusionary conduct and the rationale behind limiting illegal monopolies to
those that are exclusionary).
119. See, e.g., Edelman, How to Curb, supra note 60, at 291 (“[T]he four
premier sports leagues rarely face competition from new leagues because the
premier markets have high barriers to entry.”); Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W.
Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from Private Law and Public
Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and
the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 93–94 (1997) (discussing
barriers to entry).
120. See infra notes 121–139 and accompanying text (discussing four
hurdles: developing a fan base; lack of resources to build new stadiums;
difficulty signing talented players; and challenges obtaining a national
television contract).
121. See STEPHEN F. ROSS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS PROFESSIONALS 162 (Paul
D. Staudohar & James A. Mangan eds., 1991) (stating that a new league “must
now face a giant incumbent, entrenched in all the major media markets . . . in
the country”).

REGULATING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

599

rare occasions in the past when a rival league has successfully
(albeit temporarily) emerged, there have typically been a number
of major media markets lacking a professional team in the
sport.122 No such critical mass of unserved or underserved cities
exists today.123 Consequently, any new entrant would inevitably
need to compete in cities already occupied by existing franchises
in the dominant league.124 Gaining a foothold in such a
community will prove to be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
given the long-standing, deeply rooted fan bases supporting most
professional sports teams.
Second, any new entrant would also need to find stadiums in
which to host its games.125 Because the teams in the existing
leagues have already built lavish facilities costing hundreds of
millions of dollars, competing with the established leagues on the
stadium front will prove extremely difficult.126 Considering that
122. For example, the American Football League (AFL) successfully
challenged the NFL in the 1960s by placing franchises in a number of major but
at the time unserved markets, including Boston, Buffalo, Denver, Houston, and
Kansas City. See Alan Fecteau, NFL Network Blackouts: Old Law Meets New
Technology with the Advent of the Satellite Dish, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 221, 228
n.34 (1995) (discussing the formation of the AFL).
123. See DANIELSON, supra note 49, at 289 (declaring that “professional
sports have claimed most markets that are large enough to support major
league sports”); QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 136 (observing that leagues have
teams in enough metropolitan areas to deter the entry of rival leagues).
124. Admittedly, technological changes may eventually decrease the
importance of a sports league placing its teams in major media markets. Indeed,
as television (and Internet) broadcasting revenues continue to gain importance
in the sports industry, the time may eventually come when a league can be
profitable based almost entirely on its television contracts without respect to the
physical locations of its teams. Such a day still appears to be a ways away,
however, as a league’s presence in major media markets continues to drive the
size of their television contracts. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Leibovitz, Avoiding the
Sack: How Nebraska’s Departure from the Big 12 Changed College Football and
What Athletic Conferences Must Do to Prevent Defection in the Future, 22 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 675, 682 (2012) (noting that the recent spate of conference
realignment in college athletics has been driven by a desire for conferences to
“tap into larger television markets” in order to increase their broadcast
revenues).
125. Cf. Edelman, How to Curb, supra note 60, at 291 (noting the existing
leagues have an “almost insurmountable lead” in “obtaining playing facilities”).
126. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 135 (finding that recently
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communities will be unlikely to provide a new league with tax
subsidies that are comparable to those enjoyed by the existing
leagues127—especially those municipalities that have recently
built a new stadium for an existing franchise in the dominant
league—the entrant would need to either build its own new
facilities or else refurbish existing stadiums that are no longer
being used.128 In either case, the rival would need a significant
upfront infusion of capital to compete with the dominant league
on a facilities basis.129
Third, a would-be rival would face the challenge of signing
enough talented players to allow it to credibly claim major league
status.130 Many established players would undoubtedly be
hesitant to join a new league given its uncertain long-term
prospects, while others may simply prefer to remain with the
established organization believing that it would provide the most
constructed stadiums for the existing monopoly leagues present any would-be
rival with “an impossible hurdle” to overcome).
127. See infra Part III.A (noting that sports franchises have used the threat
of relocation to force cities to build stadiums at taxpayer expense).
128. A third potential option would be for the rival league to seek access to
use the existing league’s stadiums. See Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust
Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the
Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 809–10 (1987) (discussing section 2 issues
that are implicated when a rival league seeks access to a stadium used by an
established league). There is some precedent for such a strategy, as the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), for failure to instruct the jury on the “essential
facility” doctrine, which could arguably require a sports franchise to share its
facility with a rival franchise when creating another facility is impracticable. Id.
at 992–93. While such an option might be feasible from a scheduling standpoint
in professional football, it will prove less viable in the other sports, which
feature much more frequent games. Moreover, such a strategy would
undoubtedly entail a lengthy legal battle, and even then would provide a
suboptimal solution given the inevitable scheduling difficulties, existing signage
supporting the established team, etc.
129. See Andrew Zimbalist, The Practical Significance of Baseball’s
Presumed Antitrust Exemption, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Spring 2004, at 1, 24 (“[A]
new league would need hundreds of millions of dollars . . . to build new
stadiums . . . .”).
130. See Edelman, How to Curb, supra note 60, at 291 (noting the existing
leagues possess an “almost insurmountable lead” in “signing superstar
players”).
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challenging competition on the playing field. Meanwhile, for
those players willing to entertain an offer from a new entrant, the
rival league would need to outbid the established league for his
services. This would once again require a significant infusion of
capital as players in the existing organizations have been able to
capture a large share of the leagues’ ever-growing monopoly
profits.131 Indeed, with average salaries now in the two- to fivemillion-dollar range,132 and star players receiving as much as $30
million per year,133 any rival league would have to be extremely
well financed to recruit a sufficient number of established players
away from the dominant league in its sport.134 Consequently, an
emerging league seeking to compete in one of the four major U.S.
sports would likely find it incredibly difficult to acquire the

131. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 327 (stating that players now receive a
majority of the monopoly profits earned by the existing leagues).
132. See Monte Burke, Average Player Salaries in the Four Major American
Sports Leagues, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/
2012/12/07/average-player-salaries-in-the-four-major-american-sports-leagues/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (reporting salary information) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. See Jon Heyman, Miguel Cabrera’s record $292M contract not as crazy
as it seems, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 28, 2014, 9:55 AM), http://www.cbssports
.com/mlb/writer/jon-heyman/24504279/cabreras-record-contract-for-292-millionisnt-as-crazy-as-it-seems (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (noting that MLB star
Miguel Cabrera will earn $30 million per season from the Detroit Tigers) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. Conversely, a new entrant could try to lure unsigned, up-and-coming
players to its league. The feasibility of such a strategy would vary by sport. For
instance, because both the NFL and NBA impose age restrictions on their
incoming players, a rival league could potentially sign a significant number of
major-league-ready prospects simply by recruiting them before they are able to
sign with a team in the established league. Cf. Marc Edelman & C. Keith
Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA’s Mandatory Age/Education Policy From a
Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional
Sports Landscape, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 32 n.99 (2008) (“The emergence of
a rival professional sports league often impacts whether the dominant league
attempts to maintain age/education policies.”). However, this approach would
likely require the rival league to wait several years to collect and develop
enough talent to make a legitimate claim to major league status. Even then,
many talented prospects may hesitate to sign with a new entrant, fearing that
the decision would have adverse ramifications on their careers in the future
should the new league collapse.
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critical mass of talent necessary to legitimately declare itself a
major league.
Finally, one last barrier to entry that any new rival would
inevitably confront is obtaining a national television contract.135
Unlike in decades past when ticket sales constituted the
predominant source of a league’s revenue, today as much as twothirds of a league’s income is derived from its television broadcast
agreements.136 While sports broadcasting is an increasingly
valuable asset for television stations—offering nearly DVR-proof
programming137—networks may nevertheless hesitate before
committing hundreds of millions of dollars to an unproven
venture, especially one that will likely struggle to acquire elite
playing talent.138 Thus, any new entrant in the professional
sports industry will likely find itself facing a catch-22, unable to
generate substantial television revenue until it signs a sufficient
pool of talent but lacking the financial means to sign elite players
without a significant television contract.139
For all these reasons, the odds that a new rival league will
successfully emerge in this day and age to challenge the NFL,
NBA, NHL, or MLB are exceedingly remote.140 Without any such
135. See SCULLY, supra note 6, at 29 (“Access to television may be a
necessary condition for the survival of a new league.”).
136. See Michelle R. Hull, Sports Leagues’ New Social Media Policies:
Enforcement Under Copyright Law and State Law, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 457,
464 (2011) (reporting that the NFL earns two-thirds of its revenue from
television, while MLB and the NBA each receive one-half of their income from
their television deals).
137. See Symposium, “Moneyball’s” Impact on Business and Sports, 19 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 457 (2012) (quoting television executive Phil Griffin as
stating that sports programming is unique because most fans are unwilling to
record and watch it later).
138. See Christian M. McBurney, Note, The Legality of Sports Leagues’
Restrictive Admissions Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 941 n.100 (1985) (noting
that rival leagues’ perceived “second class” status makes it much “more difficult
for the rival to attract national television contracts and press coverage”).
139. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 328 (noting that new leagues face a
“vicious circle” insofar as they “cannot get stars until they have lucrative
television and stadium deals, and they cannot get those deals until they have
the stars”).
140. See Ross & Szymanski, Open Competition, supra note 2, at 645
(declaring that the formation of a new major league is not feasible).
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credible challenge, the four major leagues have had neither the
opportunity nor the need to engage in any sort of exclusionary
conduct over the last thirty years and thus have not run afoul of
section 2. Consequently, because the leagues do not presently
violate the Sherman Act’s antimonopolization provision, antitrust
law is unable to effectively curtail their monopoly power.141
Moreover, even on those rare occasions in the past when a
rival has challenged the established league in its sport, section 2
has provided little protection to the new entrant.142 For example,
the rival United States Football League (USFL) successfully
litigated a section 2 monopolization case against the NFL in the
mid-1980s, convincing a jury that the established league had
engaged in unlawful exclusionary conduct by both attempting to
co-opt potential USFL owners and preventing the new league
from signing its players.143 Despite siding with the rival league,
the jury concluded that any resulting harm to the USFL was de
minimis, awarding it only $1 in damages (an amount
subsequently trebled to $3).144
Therefore, even if a new rival league were to emerge and one
of the monopoly leagues were to engage in some form of
exclusionary conduct, history suggests that the new entrant
141. See Piraino, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 892 (stating that courts have
been unable to “effectively regulat[e] the leagues’ abuses of monopoly power”).
142. See Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63
TUL. L. REV. 751, 754 n.15 (1989) (stating that “Section 2 challenges . . . have
been relatively rare and uniformly unsuccessful”).
143. See U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1341
(2d Cir. 1988) (“The jury’s finding of illegal monopolization of a market of majorleague professional football was based upon evidence of NFL attempts to co-opt
USFL owners, an NFL Supplemental Draft of USFL players, an NFL roster
increase, and NFL conduct directed at particular USFL franchises.”).
144. See id. at 1341, 1380 (affirming jury award on appeal). Similarly, in
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the rival World Hockey Association (WHA) sued the
NHL under section 2. Id. at 467. Despite receiving a district court injunction
restraining the NHL from continuing to interfere with its operations, most of
the WHA’s teams nevertheless collapsed within the span of a few seasons. See
Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’
Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 49 n.69
(2008) (reporting that the WHA was bankrupt by 1979).
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would be unlikely to receive any appreciable benefit from section
2. As a result, neither section 1 nor section 2 of the Sherman Act
reliably protects the public from anticompetitive conduct by the
four monopoly U.S. professional sports leagues.
III. Professional Sports Leagues Use Their Monopoly Power to
Abuse the Public Interest with Little Legal Ramification
Given the difficulties in applying section 1 of the Sherman
Act to professional sports leagues, and section 2’s general
inapplicability to most league conduct, the four U.S. monopoly
leagues have been able to abuse the public interest with little
legal ramification. Indeed, as discussed below, courts have been
largely unable or unwilling to regulate league conduct in two
critical areas: (1) league expansion (and, relatedly, stadium
subsidies) and (2) television broadcasting.
A. League Expansion and Stadium Subsidies
The most notable area in which antitrust law has failed to
protect the public interest and prevent leagues from exploiting
their monopoly power is league expansion. Few decisions made by
a professional sports league will have a greater impact on the
public than the number of teams allowed to compete in the
organization.145 Most obviously, by increasing the number of
teams in existence, a league will produce a greater number of
games for fans to enjoy. More perniciously, however, by
restricting the number of teams below the level that the market
would bear, leagues can create an artificial shortage of
franchises, allowing them to extract significant monopoly rents—
often in the form of stadium subsidies—from the public.146
145. See infra notes 155–157 and accompanying text (contending that
artificial scarcity of teams considerably increases the value of franchises).
146. See, e.g., Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 5 (concluding that the leagues’
control of expansion has enabled them to engage in rent-seeking by demanding
stadium subsidies from municipalities).
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Each professional sports league tightly controls the
admission of new teams into its organization, typically requiring
that any expansion be approved by three-fourths of league
owners.147 Determining the optimal size of a professional sports
league is a delicate task, requiring a league to weigh the potential
revenue and welfare gains that would result from the formation
of a new team against the risk that expansion poses to overall fan
interest in the league product and the continued viability of its
existing teams.148
Over expansion can harm fan interest in several ways. First,
because the number of elite players in any given sport is finite,
leagues must guard against over expansion to avoid diluting their
level of play to a point where it is no longer attractive to fans.149
Second, any increase in the size of a league necessarily reduces
each individual team’s chances of winning the league title; if each
franchise’s championship odds drop too far, fans may lose interest
in rooting for a team with only a minuscule chance of winning the
overall championship competition.150 Third, as more teams are
added to the league, existing franchises will play fewer games
147. See, e.g., Piraino, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 905 (noting that each of
the “leagues’ bylaws . . . requires a three-fourths vote of their members to
approve relocation of an existing team or the granting of an expansion
franchise”).
148. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 661 (“It is difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain precisely the optimal number of franchises in major
league sports.”); Feldman, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 7, at 885 (contending
that leagues “obviously [have] a legitimate interest in limiting the number of
teams in the league—for example, teams must be economically viable and an
excessive number of teams would dilute the talent level on each team”); Roberts,
Sports Leagues, supra note 49, at 280 n.210 (listing reasons why a “league might
oppose expanding league membership”).
149. See, e.g., SCULLY, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that “spreading a more or
less fixed supply of star players over a greater number of teams” can dilute “the
quality of play”). But see Piraino, Antitrust Rationale, supra note 48, at 1711
(arguing that fans desire parity within a league, not an absolute high level of
play); Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 664 (contending that any decrease
in playing quality would typically be offset by an increase in the number of fans
able to enjoy the league’s games postexpansion).
150. See Piraino, Antitrust Rationale, supra note 48, at 1712 (acknowledging
that “[a]nother argument against league expansion is its supposed reduction in
the percentage of teams with a chance to win a championship”).
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against one another, decreasing the frequency with which fans
can watch traditional rivals meet on the playing field.151
Moreover, leagues must also restrict expansion to protect
their existing host cities from becoming over saturated with
franchises. While major metropolises like New York City and Los
Angeles can profitably accommodate multiple teams in most
sports, smaller communities like Salt Lake City, Cincinnati,
Buffalo, and Jacksonville would likely struggle to support more
than one team in any major professional sports league.152
Therefore, by providing certain locales with too many teams,
leagues would risk a destabilizing wave of team failures,
wreaking havoc on their operations.
Nevertheless, despite these valid motives for rejecting a
proposed expansion, the potential exists for leagues to restrict
their size for more nefarious purposes. As previously discussed,
even if an expansion proposal were expected to increase revenues
league wide, and thus enhance consumer welfare, teams will still
typically reject the proposal if their own share of league profits is
expected to decline.153 Thus, individual franchises will in many
cases have a significant incentive to make economically
inefficient decisions on behalf of the league to protect their own
self-interest.154
Furthermore, by restricting the number of teams in a league
below the level that the market can support, owners create an
artificial scarcity of franchises, thereby increasing the value of

151. See DANIELSON, supra note 49, at 174 (“Adding teams to a league
reduces the number of home games with established teams and traditional
rivals, while adding games with new teams that are often poor drawing cards.”).
152. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise
Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 157, 218
(1984) [hereinafter Lazaroff, Antitrust Implications] (acknowledging that “[i]n
some cases . . . only one team can be economically supported by a community”).
153. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (explaining that
economically efficient proposals will be rejected by teams because increases in
overall revenue for a league may not increase each team’s individual revenue).
154. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text (arguing that teams vote
against league expansion out of self-interest, even though league expansion
could result in a net gain for the entire league).
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their own existing clubs.155 Indeed, professional sports franchises
have consistently realized tremendous, well-above-market
increases in value over the last few decades, sometimes
appreciating by as much as 30% on an annual basis.156 While
several factors have undoubtedly contributed to this trend,
restricting the number of franchises to a level below market
demand has helped drive the value of professional sports teams
ever higher, further incentivizing owners to reject expansion
proposals.157
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, teams are motivated
to maintain an artificial scarcity of franchises to extract
significant public subsidies from their host communities.158
Because there are more cities desiring franchises than teams
available in a given league—and because the possibility of
starting a new rival league is impractical159—municipalities must
compete to attract or retain one of a finite number of existing
clubs. Consequently, ever since the early 1950s,160 professional
sports franchises have used the threat of relocation to force cities
to build new stadiums, or refurbish existing facilities, at taxpayer
expense.161 These public subsidies are the direct result of league
155. See Piraino, Antitrust Rationale, supra note 48, at 1698 (stating that
owners can “drive up the price” of their franchises “[b]y keeping the supply of
franchises artificially low”).
156. See Piraino, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 916 (reporting that the value
of an average NBA or NFL franchise increased approximately 30% annually
during the 1980s).
157. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of
artificial scarcity).
158. See, e.g., Ross & Szymanski, Open Competition, supra note 2, at 631
(“[L]eague members have an incentive to expand sub-optimally in order to
provide clubs with a credible threat to move to economically viable open markets
unless local taxpayers provide generous tax subsidies.”).
159. See Mitten & Burton, supra note 119, at 95 (noting that “the rate of
expansion has not been sufficient to satisfy the current demand of cities for
major league professional teams”); see also supra notes 119–139 and
accompanying text (discussing the impracticality of forming a new league).
160. See Edelman, How to Curb, supra note 60, at 285 (reporting that the
start of “professional sports’ transient era” began when the city of Milwaukee
built a publicly financed stadium for baseball’s Boston Braves in 1950).
161. See Glenn M. Wong, Of Franchise Relocation, Expansion and
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under expansion.162 If a sufficient number of teams existed, or if a
relocating team could easily be replaced with an expansion
franchise, cities would have no need to offer teams such lavish
incentives.163
Cities are willing to compete to recruit or retain professional
sports franchises because they desire the perceived reputational
and (often illusory) economic benefits that teams are believed to
provide to their host communities.164 Indeed, the loss of a
cherished sports franchise can inflict a substantial blow to local
morale.165 Local politicians, recognizing that their prospects for
Competition in Professional Team Sports: The Ultimate Political Football?, 9
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 7, 43–44 (1985) (discussing different subsidy
arrangements). The potential for a team to relocate to a new host community is
no idle threat as franchises in the four major sports moved seventy-eight times
from 1950 to 1982. Mitten & Burton, supra note 119, at 104. Moreover, that
statistic fails to account for the number of teams that threatened to relocate but
ultimately stayed put after its host community agreed to meet its subsidy
demands. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 127 (explaining that “various
teams [have] threatened to move but did not” after receiving “new stadiums or
arenas . . . [or] improvements to their existing stadiums or arenas”).
162. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 136 (arguing that leagues have
expanded sufficiently enough to deter the entry of rival leagues “while still
preserving enough vacant sites to make move threats believable,” which often
forces communities to build new stadiums).
163. Cf. John Beisner, Sports Franchise Relocation: Competitive Markets
and Taxpayer Protection, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 429, 434 (1988) (“A teamless
city may obtain a franchise through creation of a new league, expansion of an
existing league, or acquisition of a franchise located in another city. The first
two alternatives have proven to be ineffective . . . .”).
164. See Piraino, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 913 (“Local governments are
willing to invest substantial sums to attract teams, as they are desperate to
obtain the status of a ‘major league city.’”). While the reputational benefits
provided by professional sports teams are difficult to assess empirically,
economists have almost uniformly concluded that the direct economic benefits of
a new stadium are practically nonexistent. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at
154 (“In independent studies of the impact of stadiums, there are almost no
instances in which stadiums were shown to lead to a measurable increase in the
economic well-being of a city.”); Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 13–14
(reviewing the relevant economics literature).
165. See, e.g., Mitten & Burton, supra note 119, at 105 (“The relocation of a
major league professional sports team causes psychological distress and a sense
of loss to the fans of the former host city.”); Wong, supra note 161, at 11 (“The
communities which house franchises invariably have significant monetary and
emotional ties to teams which sport their name.”).

REGULATING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

609

re-election will be significantly weakened if a beloved team
vacates the city on their watch, almost invariably cave in to their
team’s stadium demands.166 Moreover, even if a critical mass of
cities were willing to take a hard stand against teams’ stadiumsubsidy demands, the cities nevertheless face a classic prisoner’s
dilemma insofar as at least one other municipality will inevitably
offer a franchise a favorable deal and thereby attract the team to
its city.167
Consequently, teams have leveraged the artificial scarcity of
professional sports franchises to extract substantial subsidies
from local governments. From 1970 to 1999, government
subsidies for new sports stadiums were estimated to total as
much as $10.4 billion, along with another $1.4 billion in
renovations to existing facilities.168 This trend has only
accelerated in the 2000s, with the NFL alone receiving $2.4
billion in stadium subsidies since 2001.169 As a result, at one
point as many as 65% of arenas and 87% of stadiums housing

166. Cf. Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 19 (“Strong civic interest in
retaining or obtaining a team means that press reports on a politician’s efforts
(or lack of effort) will be extensive and exhaustive.”). Admittedly, bad politics,
rather than just monopoly power alone, may be partially to blame for local
municipalities’ continued inability to take a hard stand against teams’ stadiumsubsidy demands. Indeed, as public choice theory recognizes, “politicians, like
other people, tend to promote their self-interest.” Donald A. Dripps, Criminal
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t
Legislatures Give A Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1079, 1080 (1993).
167. See Marc Edelman, The House that Taxpayers Built: Exploring the Rise
in Publicly Funded Baseball Stadiums from 1953 Through the Present, 16 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 258 n.6 (2009) [hereinafter Edelman, House that
Taxpayers Built] (“The mayors of American cities are confronted with a
prisoner’s dilemma. . . . [I]f Mayor A is not willing to pay the price, Mayor B may
think it is advantageous to open up the city’s wallet.”).
168. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 7 (“American governments spend
astonishing sums constructing new sporting facilities for private professional
sports teams. Between 1970 and the end of 1999, the tally in the United States
was $10.4 billion.”).
169. See id. (“The NFL alone has commanded public stadium subsidies of at
least $2.4 billion since 2001.”).
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teams in the four major U.S. professional sports leagues were
publicly owned.170
These facilities have been estimated to cost their host
communities as much as $500 million per year, with
approximately 70% to 80% of the total construction costs being
borne by local taxpayers.171 While such stadium subsidies will
obviously have the most direct impact on citizens in the local
communities footing the bill, the total cost of construction
actually spreads much further. Because most stadium projects
are financed using federally tax-exempt bonds, U.S. taxpayers
effectively subsidize local communities’ stadium construction
efforts, costing the federal treasury as much as $120 million over
the course of thirty years for just a single $300 million stadium.172
Thus, in sum, municipal stadium subsidies to the NFL alone have
been estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers as much as $1 billion per
year.173
The opportunity costs attached to these subsidies are
considerable. Instead of providing extra revenue to support local
schools, social services, or even tax cuts, citizens instead provide
corporate welfare to billionaire monopolist team owners.174 For
example, the city of Cincinnati is currently paying $33 million per
170. See SCULLY, supra note 6, at 24 (“Eighty-seven percent of the stadiums
and sixty-five percent of the arenas are publically owned, and rent of the
facilities is heavily subsidized by taxpayers.”).
171. See Edelman, House that Taxpayers Built, supra note 167, at 257
(“Local governments pay on average between seventy and eighty percent of the
costs of new stadium construction.”); Piraino, Antitrust Rationale, supra note 48,
at 1701 (reporting that “subsidies for professional sports teams currently drain
$500 million annually from state and local governments”).
172. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 264 (“[I]f the total facility costs $300
million and the bond term is thirty years, the federal revenues lost on the taxfree interest will be $60–$120 million . . . .”); Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 11
(discussing the use of federally tax-exempt municipal bonds to construct sports
stadiums).
173. See Easterbrook, supra note 9 (estimating that “[a]nnualized, NFL
stadium subsidies and tax favors add up to perhaps $1 billion”).
174. See Roger I. Abrams, Hardball in City Hall: Public Financing of Sports
Stadiums, 3 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 164, 176 (2013) (suggesting
that tax dollars could be better used for “public schools, transportation, housing,
roads and infra-structure”).
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year in debt service and operating costs for two stadiums built in
the early 2000s for MLB’s Cincinnati Reds and the NFL’s
Cincinnati Bengals, an amount totaling more than one-fourth of
the $119 million recently cut from the city’s local school budget.175
Similarly, the state of Minnesota recently approved an
expenditure of $506 million for a new stadium for the NFL’s
Minnesota Vikings despite the fact that the state was facing a
projected budget deficit of $1.1 billion.176 In some cases,
municipalities will even agree to build a new stadium for a team
while still paying off the bonds for the old one.177
Consequently, professional sports teams have strong
incentives to expand their leagues at a much slower rate than
market forces would dictate.178 The resulting artificial scarcity of
teams not only increases the values of existing franchises but also
enables teams to extract hundreds of millions of dollars in tax
subsidies from their local communities, all while depriving fans of
additional opportunities to watch their favorite sports.179
Unfortunately, the Sherman Act has been unable to prevent
the monopoly sports leagues from artificially restricting their
size.180 Indeed, no league has ever been forced to add a new team
under antitrust law as courts have consistently refused to order
sports leagues to expand their membership.181 For example, in
175. See Easterbrook, supra note 9 (reporting payments made by Hamilton
County, Ohio to support Cincinnati’s NFL and MLB teams).
176. See id. (noting that when the Vikings “were vaguely threatening to
decamp to another state if they didn’t get” a new stadium, the Minnesota
legislature responded by “extract[ing] $506 million from taxpayers as a gift to
the team”).
177. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 9 (“[T]eams are often able to
convince local politicians that their facility is obsolete before the government
has even finished paying for it.”).
178. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 656 (“Monopoly sports
leagues have significant economic incentives to keep the number of franchises
below the number that would exist in a free market.”).
179. See id. at 650 (“Team owners use their significant advantage in
bargaining power to extract subsidies from local treasuries.”).
180. See infra notes 181–187 and accompanying text (discussing the
Sherman Act’s failure to thwart artificial size restriction).
181. See Piraino, Antitrust Rationale, supra note 48, at 1677–78 (observing
that “owners have successfully conspired to keep the number of franchises
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Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League,182 a franchise in
the defunct World Football League sought to gain admission into
the NFL.183 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
Grizzlies’ claim, finding that the NFL’s refusal to admit the team
into its league did not violate the Sherman Act.184 In particular,
the court noted that the plaintiff had not alleged that the NFL
hindered its ability to compete against the existing league but
instead stressed that the Grizzlies merely sought to join the
league as a copartner.185 As a result, the court concluded that the
NFL’s decision was actually procompetitive insofar as it left
Memphis unoccupied and thus a potential market for a future
rival league to occupy.186 Other courts considering the issue have
employed similar logic,187 and, as a result, federal antitrust law
has failed to address the significant harm that league underexpansion has inflicted on the public.
Moreover, the entire notion of judicially mandated expansion
is problematic in several respects.188 First, courts are particularly
poorly suited to determine whether a specific proposed expansion
substantially below that which would exist in a free market”). One trial court
did order a sports league to expand under antitrust law but was later reversed
on appeal under baseball’s antitrust exemption. See State v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 7–8, 17 (Wis. 1966) (reversing a trial court decision
requiring the MLB to replace the departed Milwaukee Braves under state
antitrust law).
182. 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
183. Id. at 776; see also Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 224
(discussing the Mid-South Grizzlies case).
184. See Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 776 (stating that the “case does
not present any issue of possible antitrust violation from the exclusion of
potential competitors in the designated exclusive home territories”).
185. See id. at 776–77 (highlighting that the Grizzlies “sought to participate”
in the NFL and analyzing the complaint’s deficiencies).
186. See id. at 786–88 (rejecting the Grizzlies’ Sherman Act claims).
187. See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 783
F.2d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to order the NHL to admit a former
rival league team and affirming the trial court’s finding that the NHL’s decision
to exclude “was procompetitive, rather than anti-competitive in its effect and
hence not violative of the anti-trust laws” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. See Edelman, How to Curb, supra note 60, at 304 (concluding that
court-ordered expansion “is a poor solution”); Mitten & Burton, supra note 119,
at 125 n.417 (discussing the problems with judicially mandated expansion).
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team would be financially viable, considering that the success of a
franchise depends not only on quantifiable data like the host
city’s population and average income but also on less easily
quantifiable factors such as the expected level of local fan interest
and the effect of league-wide talent dilution.189 And even if a
court could be expected to reliably determine whether a proposed
expansion team would be likely to succeed, the judiciary is
nevertheless poorly positioned to decide which of several
competing expansion proposals is the strongest.190 Because a
court would likely have only one proposed expansion site before it
at a given time, it may be required to decide whether to order a
league to expand to a particular market without knowing if other,
more deserving sites exist.191 This creates two related problems.
First, because any court-ordered expansion would likely be
limited, prospective owners will be forced to “race to the
courthouse” to secure one of the few available expansion
franchises.192 Second, such suits will inevitably be filed in
hometown courts, creating the possibility that a locally minded
judge will force a league to expand into a city even though
another location is objectively more deserving of the team.193
In fact, if anything, the application of antitrust law has
exacerbated the stadium subsidy problem because courts have
used section 1 of the Sherman Act to strike down league
restrictions forbidding teams from relocating without league
approval.194 Most notably, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
189. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 225–26 (arguing that courtordered expansion is an improper solution).
190. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 709–10 (observing that
“[c]ourts cannot make [expansion] decisions in a vacuum”).
191. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 226 (contending that courts
are ill-equipped to make expansion decisions).
192. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 710 (“Allowing those who
happen to win the ‘race to the courthouse’ to prevail does not serve the public
interest.”).
193. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 226 (asserting that hometown
bias might affect a judge’s ability to make expansion decisions).
194. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562,
567–68 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that “franchise movement restrictions are not
invalid as a matter of law” and that a rule of reason analysis governs such
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Commission v. National Football League,195 the Ninth Circuit
held that the NFL’s policy requiring any franchise move to be
approved by three-fourths of league owners constituted an illegal
restraint of trade.196 While these precedents do not completely
foreclose a league’s ability to lawfully reject a proposed franchise
relocation,197 they have nevertheless had a substantial chilling
effect as leagues are now extremely hesitant to block a move for
fear of incurring treble damages liability.198 As a result, team
owners know that they can often move their franchises without
any serious risk of league interference, giving individual rogue
owners even greater leverage to extract stadium subsidies from
their home communities.199
Consequently, antitrust law is poorly suited to resolve the
issue of professional sports league under-expansion. Instead, as
discussed in Part V, an alternative regulatory solution is needed
to alleviate the harmful impact that the artificial scarcity of
professional sports teams has had on the public.200

restrictions); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding jury’s determination that the NFL’s
franchise-movement policy was an unreasonable restraint of trade).
195. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
196. See id. at 1395–98 (analyzing the NFL’s franchise-movement policy).
197. For example, the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum court noted that a
league could properly deny a proposed expansion if the rejection were expressly
premised on factors such as protecting the loyalty of fans in the franchise’s
current host city, preserving natural rivalries, permitting municipalities the
time to recoup their investments in local stadiums, and maintaining a league
presence in major television markets. Id. at 1396–97.
198. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 253 (explaining that the fear of treble
damages has stopped the NFL from preventing its teams from moving).
199. This is not to suggest that leagues should be given complete discretion
to control franchise relocation. While a league does have a legitimate interest in
regulating where its teams play, it cannot be expected to reliably protect the
public interest from relocation threats.
200. See infra Part V (arguing that government regulation is needed).
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B. Television Broadcasting
Television (and, increasingly, Internet) broadcasting has
become the predominant means through which the public
consumes professional sporting events. Whereas most games are
only witnessed by 20,000 to 80,000 spectators in the stadium,
millions regularly watch the action from the comfort of their own
homes.201 Consequently, monopoly sports leagues’ restraints in
the broadcasting market can have a significant detrimental
impact on the public interest.202
Unfortunately, as with league expansion and stadium
subsidies, antitrust law has also proven to be largely ineffective
at protecting the public from sports leagues’ anticompetitive
broadcasting practices. In some cases, structural barriers prevent
courts from curbing league behavior,203 while at other times a
lack of vigorous prosecution is to blame.204 In any event, the end
result is that leagues have been able to harm consumers with
little legal ramification by engaging in two primary forms of
anticompetitive conduct: (i) the exclusive, collective licensing of
their teams’ television broadcast rights205 and (ii) the imposition
of arcane television blackout rules.206

201. See Ariel Y. Bublick, Note, Are You Ready for Some Football?: How
Antitrust Laws Can Be Used to Break Up DirecTV’s Exclusive Right to Telecast
NFL’s Sunday Ticket Package, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 223, 235–37 (2011)
(discussing viewership of professional sports).
202. See infra Part III.B (explaining harm caused by leagues’ broadcasting
restraints).
203. See infra notes 231–232 and accompanying text (discussing the Sports
Broadcasting Act’s antitrust exemption of some league broadcasting policies).
204. See infra notes 234–240 and accompanying text (noting the DOJ and
FTC’s failure to initiate antitrust actions against the leagues).
205. See infra Part III.B.1 (describing collective broadcasting licensing
practices).
206. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing blackout restrictions).
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1. Collective Broadcasting Licensing Practices

In a truly competitive marketplace, each individual franchise
in a league would be free to license the broadcast rights to its
games to television networks without restriction, thereby
creating competition among teams to the benefit of broadcasters
and the public at-large.207 While the NBA, NHL, and MLB each
permit their franchises to individually license their broadcast
rights regionally, all four monopoly leagues exclusively sell their
national television rights on a league-wide basis.208 This
cartelization has allowed the leagues to demand significantly
higher broadcast fees than would be obtainable in a competitive
market—a form of monopoly rent-seeking—while at the same
time decreasing the number of games broadcast nationally.209
The experience of the National College Athletic Association
(NCAA) provides instructive empirical evidence in this regard.
Until the 1980s, the NCAA collectively negotiated a single
television package on behalf of all of its football-playing member
institutions.210 Under this plan, only twenty-eight games could be
televised per year with no individual team permitted to appear on
television more than six times in a two-year period.211 Despite the
207. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 310 (stating that “if individual teams
[were forced to] compete with one another for a larger share of the national
market for broadcasting . . . fans w[ould] then get the chance to experience more
of the product at a smaller price per item”); Roberts, Legality, supra note 90, at
61 (pointing out that competition among teams in the television marketplace
would “drive the price of the [broadcast] rights down”).
208. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 248–49 (discussing each
league’s broadcasting activities). The NFL only allows its teams to license the
broadcast rights to preseason games within their region. Id. at 249 n.193.
209. See, e.g., QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 45 (explaining that when the
NFL began negotiating television contracts on a league-wide basis, “this
converted what was essentially a competitive television rights market into a
monopolized one”); SCULLY, supra note 6, at 27 (“By pooling broadcast rights, the
leagues eliminated interclub competition in their sale and increased their share
of the rents relative to the networks’ share.”).
210. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 90–94 (1984) (summarizing the history of the NCAA’s television
plan).
211. Id. at 92–94.
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limited number of games sold under the package, the NCAA was
able to charge two networks a total of nearly $33 million per year
for the broadcast rights.212 Things changed markedly after the
Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s collective broadcasting
activities in 1984, however.213 With conferences and teams now
free to sign their own deals, the number of televised college
football games grew exponentially.214 At the same time, because
schools and conferences were now competing against one another
in the marketplace, broadcasters collectively paid half as much
for the rights to televise a larger number of games than the
NCAA had previously received for its collective package.215
Economists have predicted that the public would experience
similar benefits if professional sports leagues allowed their teams
to compete in the national broadcast marketplace.216 Indeed, if
leagues were prevented from selling their national television
broadcast rights exclusively on a collective basis, and teams were
forced to compete in the broadcast marketplace, one would expect
to find that the number of games available to be viewed on
national television would increase while the fees collected for
these broadcast rights would decline.217
In fact, policymakers are increasingly recognizing that the
fees sports leagues charge for their broadcast rights significantly
raise the cost of cable television for all subscribers, sports fans
212. Id. at 93.
213. See id. at 120 (affirming the circuit court’s decision finding that the
NCAA’s collective television licensing violated section 1 of the Sherman Act).
214. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 45–46 (describing an “explosion in
TV rights signings and in the number of college games on television” following
the Supreme Court’s decision).
215. See id. at 46 (noting that “the total value of the contracts negotiated by
the various teams and conferences added up to only half of the $65 million that
the NCAA had been able to obtain” from each of its network partners over a
four-year period).
216. See id. (discussing the effects of the monopolistic market for the NFL’s
national television broadcast rights).
217. See Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of
Sports Telecasts, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 501, 530 (2014) (summarizing the argument
that individual bargaining would decrease the price of broadcast rights and
increase the number of games available to consumers).
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and nonfans alike.218 For example, it has been estimated that
every cable television subscriber in the country pays
approximately $76 per year—or about 7% of the average annual
cable bill—simply for the broadcasts rights for NFL football
games, regardless of whether they ever watch a single play.219
Consequently, the public has a legitimate interest in curbing the
leagues’ monopoly power in the sale of their broadcast rights.
In addition to selling national television rights exclusively on
a collective basis, professional sports leagues also engage in other
anticompetitive, league-wide broadcast policies. For instance, all
four leagues collectively sell premium pay-per-view packages
(e.g., MLB Extra Innings, MLB.tv (Internet), NFL Sunday Ticket,
NBA League Pass, and NHL Center Ice) through which
consumers purchase the right to watch nearly every league game,
regardless of whether it is being broadcast on a local channel.220
Each league prohibits its individual teams from offering
competing services, forcing fans to purchase the right to view all
league games and not just those featuring their favorite team.221
This represents another example of monopoly rent-seeking as the
leagues leverage their monopoly power to force consumers to pay
higher prices for these pay-per-view packages than would be

218. See Todd Shields & Alex Sherman, Cable Bills Focus of Congress Push
for A La Carte Prices, BLOOMBERG (May 14, 2013, 6:02 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-14/cable-bills-focus-of-congress-pushfor-a-la-carte-prices.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (noting that Senator John
McCain proposed legislation to end bundling of cable television services in part
to prevent consumers from having to pay for the sports network ESPN if they do
not watch it) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. See Derek Thompson, Mad About the Cost of TV? Blame Sports, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2013/04/mad-about-the-cost-of-tv-blame-sports/274575/ (last
visited
Mar. 25, 2015) (reporting the effect of the cost of broadcast rights on cable
subscribers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
220. See Ron Whitworth, Comment, IP Video: Putting Control in the Hands
of the Consumers, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 207, 218 (2005) (identifying the
pay-per-view services).
221. See Bublick, supra note 201, at 242–43 (noting that individual teams
are unable to offer their own pay-per-view packages).
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realized in a competitive market where each individual team sold
the rights to view its games separately.222
Further compounding matters, since 1994 the NFL has
exclusively licensed its Sunday Ticket pay-per-view service to
DirecTV.223 As a result, consumers who want to guarantee that
they will be able to watch all of their favorite out-of-market
team’s games on television not only must pay for the right to
watch every NFL game, but also must subscribe to DirecTV’s
television service to purchase the league’s pay-per-view
package.224 However, because DirecTV is not available to fans
living in many condominium or high-rise apartment buildings,
some consumers have found themselves completely unable to
watch their favorite team play.225
Finally, all four leagues have also created their own
proprietary television networks (i.e., the NFL Network, MLB
Network, NBA TV, and the NHL Network), in the process
granting these stations the exclusive right to broadcast certain
league games on a national basis.226 Because the leagues
generally charge cable companies high subscription rates to carry
their networks, some cable providers have refused to subscribe to
the channels,227 and as a result consumers have at times been

222. See id. (characterizing the leagues’ activities as collusion to prevent
individual teams from competing in the pay-per-view market).
223. See Boliek, supra note 217, at 541 (“Since its inception in 1994, the
Sunday Ticket is an exclusive contract by which the NFL has sold DirecTV
certain exclusive broadcast rights.”).
224. See id. (discussing the NFL’s exclusive contract with DirecTV, which
“allows a viewer to watch any of the NFL Sunday games”).
225. See Bublick, supra note 201, at 239 (noting that apartment landlords
often prohibit satellite dishes).
226. See Ethan Flatt, Note, Solidifying the Defensive Line: The NFL
Network’s Current Position Under Antitrust Law and How It Can Be Improved,
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637, 640 n.13 (2009) (identifying the four league
networks).
227. See Ross C. Paolino, Upon Further Review: How NFL Network Is
Violating the Sherman Act, 16 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 5 (2009) (stating that some
cable companies have refused to carry the NFL Network due to its excessive
cost).
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completely unable to watch a game involving their hometown
team from the comfort of their own home.228
To date, antitrust law has failed to curb any of these
anticompetitive broadcasting practices. Regarding the leagues’
collectively negotiated national television agreements, any wouldbe litigant would have to overcome a significant structural
barrier when challenging many of these contracts in court.229
Specifically, the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (SBA)230
provides the four leagues with a limited antitrust exemption
allowing them to pool the sale of their broadcasting rights to overthe-air networks such as ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox (i.e., so-called
“sponsored telecasting”).231 The SBA was originally passed at the
behest of the NFL, after a federal district court enjoined the
organization’s initial attempts to enter a league-wide
broadcasting agreement with CBS.232
While the SBA thus prevents litigants from contesting the
leagues’ collective national television broadcast agreements with
the over-the-air networks, it does not apply to the leagues’ similar
contracts with cable stations like ESPN or the leagues’ own
proprietary
networks.233
Nevertheless,
none
of
these
arrangements have ever been significantly challenged under
antitrust law.234 Indeed, both the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission have stated that, although sports

228. See id. at 3–4 (discussing the 2007 controversy involving games
broadcast exclusively on the NFL Network).
229. See infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (explaining the
statutory provision exempting some league collective broadcasting contracts
from antitrust scrutiny).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
231. See id. (providing an exemption for pooling certain broadcast rights).
232. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D.
Pa. 1961) (prohibiting performance of the NFL’s agreement with CBS); see also
Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 659 (recounting the history of the SBA).
233. See Shaw v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301–02
(3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the SBA applies only to games on “free broadcast
television”).
234. Cf. Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 249 (noting that the “leagues’
agreements with cable networks have rarely been subject to antitrust scrutiny”).
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leagues’ cable broadcast agreements are beyond the scope of the
SBA, they do not warrant antitrust action by the agencies.235
In fact, the only instance in which the leagues’ collective
television broadcast practices have faced any significant
challenge under the Sherman Act is with respect to their pay-perview packages.236 Specifically, litigants have contested the
legality of both the NFL’s exclusive license of its Sunday Ticket
package to DirecTV237 as well as the NBA’s refusal to allow
consumers to purchase the right to view individual out-of-market
games through its pay-per-view service.238 Unfortunately, in both
cases the efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful, as the NFL was
able to settle its case without being forced to make the Sunday
Ticket package permanently available on a wider basis,239 while
the suit against the NBA was dismissed by the district court for
lack of standing.240
Of course, the fact that the leagues’ collective television
broadcast activities have not been significantly challenged to date
does not mean that they will continue to avoid vigorous
prosecution in the future. Indeed, two such suits are currently
pending against the NHL and MLB.241 Nevertheless, such suits
235. See JEROLD J. DUQUETTE, REGULATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL
ANTITRUST 95 (1999) (discussing the agencies’ opinion that the SBA “does
not cover cable television deals” but deciding that “existing league cable
contracts did not warrant [agency] action”).
236. See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text (discussing challenges
to pay-per-view packages).
237. See Shaw, 172 F.3d at 300–01 (summarizing the suit challenging the
Sunday Ticket agreement with DirecTV).
238. See Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177,
1185 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (alleging that prohibiting “the sale of rights of any NBA
game outside of the team’s assigned geographic territory except through the
‘NBA League Pass’ is not reasonably necessary to achieve any legitimate
business objective”).
239. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 250 (reporting that “the NFL
settled [the] lawsuit challenging its exclusive license of the ‘Sunday Ticket’
television package to satellite provider DirecTV without having to agree to
distribute the service more widely” (footnote omitted)).
240. See Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (granting defendants’ motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims).
241. See Complaint at 2, Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 12–
AND
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must overcome several potentially strong defenses supporting the
leagues.242 First, the leagues can contend that any fan attempting
to challenge a collective broadcasting policy lacks the antitrust
standing necessary to contest the practice.243 Indeed, because
league broadcast rights are usually sold directly from the league
to a television network or cable provider, fans are merely indirect
purchasers of the broadcasts, a classification that the Supreme
Court has held lacks sufficient standing to sue under the
Sherman Act.244 Meanwhile, although the networks or cable
companies would have antitrust standing to challenge these
practices as direct purchasers, they have shown little inclination
to contest the leagues’ broadcast policies, likely to avoid the risk
of antagonizing a potential future broadcast partner.245
Moreover, even if a plaintiff satisfied the antitrust standing
requirement, the leagues would still be able to assert several
potential procompetitive benefits in defense of their broadcasting
practices under the rule of reason.246 First, because the home
cv–3704 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2012) (alleging that MLB’s broadcast
agreements “eliminate competition in the distribution of games over the
Internet and television”); Complaint at 2, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, No.
12–cv–1817 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012) (contending that the NHL’s
broadcast agreements violate the Sherman Act).
242. See infra notes 243–251 (discussing possible defenses).
243. See Boliek, supra note 217, at 531 (stating that “plaintiff standing
requirements have not been established in most cases” challenging league
broadcasting activities).
244. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728–36 (1977) (determining
that indirect purchasers do not have standing to seek damages under federal
antitrust laws); see also Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (applying the indirect purchaser rule to
reject an antitrust challenge brought against the NBA League Pass pay-perview service); Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts
with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 485 (1990) [hereinafter Ross, Antitrust
Analysis] (noting that “[s]ports fans do not pay directly to watch NFL football on
television”). Fans would arguably qualify as direct purchasers of league Internet
broadcast packages, however, as these services are sold directly to consumers
from the leagues.
245. Cf. James Andrew Miller & Ken Belson, N.F.L. Said to Have Pressured
ESPN, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2013, at D1 (reporting that ESPN pulled out of its
partnership with PBS to produce the critical documentary “League of Denial”
after the NFL objected to the network’s involvement).
246. See Ross & Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient, supra note 53, at 239
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team owns the broadcast rights to any game played in its stadium
at common law,247 the leagues could assert that league-wide,
collective licensing of broadcasts allows teams to overcome the
significant transaction costs that would be entailed should
franchises be forced to negotiate with each other to individually
license the rights to their own road games.248 Thus, the leagues
can contend that, at least in some cases, their collective broadcast
agreements may actually increase the number of games available
to consumers and therefore do not violate the Sherman Act.249
Second, the leagues can argue that by pooling their television
rights they enhance competitive balance among their franchises
by splitting all league-wide television revenue equally among the
teams.250 Finally, the leagues can assert that their collective
broadcast agreements help ensure that games involving a greater
diversity of teams are shown on national television.251 Whether
these alleged benefits justify the elimination of competition
between a league’s teams in the television marketplace can, of
course, be debated; at a minimum, though, they render the
success of any potential antitrust challenge uncertain.
Therefore, even though one federal court has previously
concluded that the monopoly sports leagues’ cartelization of
(“[A]ny rights sales by a club-run league constitutes an agreement among
competing clubs to jointly sell valuable rights, which is subject to rule of reason
analysis . . . .”).
247. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492
(W.D. Pa. 1938) (noting that a team has “the exclusive right to broadcast
play-by-play descriptions of the games played” at its home field).
248. See Ross & Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient, supra note 53, at 218
(explaining that “club-run leagues forego attractive business opportunities
because they are unable to overcome the significant transactions costs involved
in agreeing on how to distribute the proceeds from the opportunity”).
249. See Ross, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 244, at 478 (contending that
the key antitrust issue in league broadcasting cases “is whether viewership is
lower because of the challenged contract than it would be if that contract were
enjoined”).
250. See SCULLY, supra note 6, at 27–28 (stating that national, league-wide
broadcast agreements help leagues alleviate revenue disparities between large
and small market teams).
251. See id. at 28 (noting that “[w]ith the rise of national rights and league
pooling of these rights, fans see a wider array of games”).
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national television broadcast rights violates the Sherman Act,252
such activity today is either immune from, or rarely contested
under, federal antitrust law.253 Consequently, the existing legal
regime has failed to satisfactorily protect the public interest from
the harmful effects of sports leagues’ collective television
broadcasting practices.
2. Blackout Restrictions
In addition to eliminating competition in the national
television broadcast market, sports leagues also injure the public
by imposing arcane and anticompetitive television blackout
policies that prevent games from being broadcast in particular
markets.254 Of these restraints, the NFL’s blackout rule has
historically generated the most criticism.255 Specifically, between
1973 and 2011, the NFL refused to allow any game that was not
sold out at least seventy-two hours in advance to be televised in
the home team’s city256 (prior to that time, every game was
blacked out in the host team’s market regardless of ticket
availability).257 As a result, in some years as many as 25%–30% of
the league’s games were blacked out in their home market,
depriving fans of the opportunity to watch their local team play

252. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D.
Pa. 1961) (finding that the NFL’s two-year exclusive broadcasting contract with
CBS violated the Sherman Act).
253. See supra notes 207–252 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial
treatment of leagues’ collective broadcasting licensing practices).
254. See, e.g., Sonali Chitre, Technology and Copyright Law—Illuminating
the NFL’s ‘Blackout’ Rule in Game Broadcasting, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J.
97, 98 (2010) (“A ‘blackout’ blocks certain programs from being broadcast in a
particular market.”).
255. See id. at 99 (finding that the NFL’s “blackout rule has been widely
criticized”).
256. See id. at 98–99 (explaining the NFL’s blackout policy).
257. See, e.g., Ray L. Waters, 21st Century Corporate Mediathletics: How Did
We Get to Slamball?, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 n.3 (2003)
(declaring that “[t]he NFL had a policy requiring TV blackouts within a 75-mile
radius until 1973”).
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on television.258 Although the NFL has justified this measure on
the basis of protecting the home team’s ticket revenue, critics
argue that the policy is especially injurious to lower- and middleincome fans who cannot afford to pay the ever escalating price to
attend a game in person.259 Bowing to public pressure, the league
initially agreed to relax its rules in 2012—by only blacking out
games where the home team had failed to sell at least 85%
percent of available tickets three days before kickoff260—before
temporarily suspending the rule in its entirety for the 2015
season.261
While the NFL is the only league that has imposed a
blackout in the home team’s market based on ticket sales, the
NBA, NHL, and MLB each employ blackout policies of their own
with respect to their television and Internet pay-per-view services
discussed above.262 Specifically, consumers residing within a
team’s designated broadcast territory cannot watch that club’s
games through the pay-per-view packages but instead must
watch the game on whichever local television station, if any, is
broadcasting it.263
258. See NFL eases local TV blackout restrictions for upcoming season,
NFL.COM
(July
26,
2012,
8:14
PM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/
story/09000d5d82a406ee/article/nfl-eases-local-tv-blackout-restrictions-for-up
coming-season (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (reporting that “15 to 20 years
ago . . . 25 to 30 percent of games were routinely blacked out”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
259. See Bublick, supra note 201, at 231 (noting that the NFL has argued
that blackouts are necessary to “ensure that every team, including the less
talented ones, would be able to build a strong fan base and generate revenue”).
260. See NFL eases local TV blackout restrictions for upcoming season, supra
note 258 (announcing change in blackout rule).
261. See NFL to suspend TV blackout policy, ESPN.COM (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12545081/nfl-suspend-tv-blackout-policy-2015owners-vote (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (reporting that NFL “teams voted for a
one-year suspension of the long-standing blackout policy for the [2015]
preseason and regular season”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
262. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing other leagues’
pay-per-view services); see also Chitre, supra note 254, at 98 n.8 (explaining that
the other leagues’ blackout polices “are not based on attendance”).
263. See, e.g., Bublick, supra note 201, at 238 (noting that the NFL’s
“blackout rule still applies to Sunday Ticket subscribers”).
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While consumers subscribing to a league’s television pay-perview package will often receive the network that is airing the
blacked out game, this is not always the case. Indeed, in some
cases the league blackout territories extend to regions in which a
game is unavailable to be viewed on a fan’s local cable service. For
instance, MLB notoriously blacks out games from its MLB Extra
Innings service hundreds of miles from a home team’s ballpark,
even if the game is unavailable on local television.264 Under this
policy, for example, residents of Iowa are unable to watch any
game involving the Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, Kansas City
Royals, Milwaukee Brewers, Minnesota Twins, or St. Louis
Cardinals, potentially subjecting as many as six of the fifteen MLB
games played on any given day to blackout.265
Meanwhile, other consumers may not subscribe to cable
television at all, instead preferring to watch their favorite team
play via the league’s Internet broadcast service. Because the
league blackout policies typically also extend to their Internet payper-view packages,266 however, fans residing in their team’s
designated broadcast market cannot watch their favorite local
team play via the Internet, but instead must subscribe to cable to
watch the games.267 Such restrictions will only become more
264. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 250 n.203 (stating that “MLB
maintains blackout policies preventing the telecasting of various MLB games in
certain cities at particular times”).
265. See Wendy Thurm, MLB Blackout Policy Under Attack in the Courts,
FANGRAPHS, http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/mlb-blackout-policy-under-attackin-the-courts/ (last updated Jan. 22, 2013) (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (featuring
MLB’s blackout map indicating that fans living in Iowa are blacked out from
viewing games involving six teams) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Similarly, fans in Las Vegas are unable to watch any game involving
the Arizona Diamondbacks, Los Angeles Angels, Los Angeles Dodgers, Oakland
Athletics, San Francisco Giants, or San Diego Padres. Id.
266. See Sascha D. Meinrath, James W. Losey & Victor W. Pickard, Digital
Feudalism: Enclosures and Erasures From Digital Rights Management to the
Digital Divide, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 423, 448 (2011) (discussing MLB’s use
of blackouts with respect to its MLB.tv Internet service).
267. See Stephen Dixon, A Channel Worth Changing? The Individual
Regional Sports Network: Proliferation, Profits, Parity, and the Potential
Administrative and Antitrust Issues That Could Follow, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 302, 312 n.32 (2013) (stating that MLB uses its blackout
policies to force fans to subscribe to cable networks carrying its games).
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onerous in the future as society increasingly consumes its
entertainment via Internet broadcast rather than traditional overthe-air and cable television.
If the leagues operated in a truly competitive marketplace,
with multiple competing leagues in each sport battling for
television contracts and fan attention, then market forces would
likely prevent the leagues from imposing such overly burdensome
blackout restrictions. Unfortunately, as with the leagues’ collective
television broadcasting agreements, antitrust law has also failed to
provide the public with any meaningful relief from the monopoly
leagues’ blackout policies. Indeed, in the only reported decision to
date, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania actually affirmed an
NFL rule preventing other teams’ games from being broadcast into
a home team’s market on the day it was hosting a game.268
Although the district court acknowledged that such a policy
technically violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, it nevertheless
believed the rule was necessary to protect the home team’s
attendance and thereby to prevent “disastrous financial effects”
from afflicting the league.269
This policy was codified in the SBA.270 Section 1292 of the Act
expressly authorizes the leagues to blackout games from network
television “within the home territory of a member club of the
league on a day when such club is playing a game at home.”271
Although both Congress and the Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) have recently questioned this policy, any
attempts to repeal this portion of the SBA have been unsuccessful

268. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 325–26
(E.D. Pa. 1953) (affirming a blackout rule and noting that “[r]easonable
protection of home game attendance is essential to the very existence of the
individual clubs”).
269. See id. at 326 (“The purposes of the Sherman Act certainly will not be
served by prohibiting [the] clubs, particularly the weaker clubs, from protecting
their home gate receipts . . . .”).
270. See 15 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012) (providing limited protection to leagues’
local telecasting restrictions).
271. Id.
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to date.272 Consequently, at a minimum, the NFL’s blackout rules
are largely immune from antitrust challenge under the SBA.
Meanwhile, although the SBA does not shield the other
leagues’ blackout restrictions as applied to their pay-per-view
services, these rules have been employed for years without being
struck down under the Sherman Act.273 Moreover, none of the
recent congressional or FCC initiatives would significantly curb
the use of blackouts for purposes of pay-per-view cable or Internet
broadcasts.274 Thus, antitrust law also appears unlikely to provide
consumers with any significant relief from league television
blackouts.
As a result, the U.S. monopoly sports leagues have been able
to impose anticompetitive broadcasting practices on the public
with little legal consequence.275 Because television has become the
primary medium through which fans watch and enjoy sporting
events, the leagues’ unchecked monopoly power in this area has

272. The FCC recently voted to abolish its regulations supporting the NFL’s
blackout restrictions as applied to cable and satellite television providers. See
FCC votes to drop blackout rule, ESPN.COM (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:22 AM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11617725/fcc-votes-drop-sports-blackouts-nflsays-change (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (noting FCC’s decision to eliminate the
“outdated and unnecessary” rule) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). However, this change does not prevent the league from continuing to
enforce its blackout policy with respect to the over-the-air networks. See John
Breech, FCC looking to eliminate sports blackout rule, CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 19,
2013, 2:08 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/24381034/fcclooking-to-eliminate-sports-blackout-rule (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (discussing
how leagues “still have the right to negotiate blackouts into [their] television
contract[s]”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
273. See supra notes 262–269 and accompanying text (discussing the
leagues’ blackout rules and noting that antitrust law has provided little relief).
274. For example, Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Richard Blumenthal
(D-CT) recently proposed the Furthering Access and Networks for Sports
(FANS) Act. See S. 1721, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (amending the SBA). Although
the FANS Act would amend the SBA to address the NFL’s blackout provision, it
would not prevent the other leagues from employing blackouts with respect to
their cable or Internet pay-per-view services. See id. § 3 (amending blackout
restriction with respect to local telecasts).
275. See supra notes 207–274 and accompanying text (discussing the failure
of antitrust law to remedy anticompetitive effects of collective broadcasting
practices and blackout rules).
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had a significant adverse impact on consumer welfare.276
Unfortunately, given the insufficiencies of federal antitrust law,
this trend appears likely to continue barring the imposition of an
alternative regulatory solution.
IV. Proposed Free Market Solutions Are Impractical and
Insufficient
Recognizing the potential for sports leagues to abuse their
monopoly power, several commentators have proposed free market
mechanisms through which they believe the anticompetitive
harms inflicted by monopoly sports leagues can be alleviated.277
These scholars contend that market-based solutions are preferable
to avoid the undesirable imposition of government regulation on
the sports industry.278 However, neither of the two primary
alternative solutions proposed in the existing literature—
divestiture or promotion and relegation—are feasible substitutes
for government regulation.279 Indeed, both options are incredibly
276. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text (describing harm to
consumers caused by broadcasting licensing practices); supra notes 254–259 and
accompanying text (explaining harm to consumers caused by television blackout
rules); supra notes 262–267 and accompanying text (noting harm to consumers
caused by pay-per-view blackout rules).
277. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 23–33 (advocating for the
implementation of a promotion and relegation system in U.S. professional sports
leagues); Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 733–48 (stating the case for
splitting up the existing monopoly sports leagues).
278. See, e.g., Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 702 (“Regulation is a
poor means of addressing the problems monopoly sports leagues cause.”).
279. In addition to these two proposals, one article has contended that the
existing monopoly leagues should be reorganized as single corporations, with a
central entity—rather than individual teams—controlling all league operations
and decisions. See Ross & Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient, supra note 53,
at 222–36 (proposing a single entity solution). While this solution would help
curb the ability of individual, self-interested teams to reject proposals that
would benefit the league as a whole, it would do little to curb the leagues’
monopoly power in the realm of television broadcasting or prevent leagues from
demanding stadium subsidies. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text
(discussing teams’ tendencies to make self-interested decisions that are
economically inefficient for the league).
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unlikely to ever be enacted and, in any event, would likely fail to
fully protect the public from the monopoly sports leagues absent
the very sort of government regulation the proposals seek to avoid.
A. Divestiture
Some commentators, most notably Professor Stephen Ross,
have suggested that, rather than regulate the monopoly sports
leagues, government should instead divide them into two or more
competing leagues.280 Such a solution, these scholars contend,
would correct the abuses discussed above by eliminating the
existing leagues’ monopoly control over their respective sport.281
Instead of one league possessing the power to arbitrarily hold its
number of teams at a level below market demand, a divestiture
would create several competing leagues, each of which would
theoretically rush to occupy any un- or underserved market before
it was taken by one of its rivals.282 This, in turn, would shift the
current supply and demand equilibrium for professional sports
teams, reducing the bargaining power that leagues currently hold
over municipalities. Consequently, proponents of divestiture assert
that cities would no longer be forced to build teams lavish new
facilities at public expense but would instead potentially see
multiple teams competing for the right to establish a franchise in a
particular town.283 Meanwhile, the existence of multiple competing
leagues would also bring competition to the broadcast market,
280. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 177 (“[T]he appropriate step to take
is for the Justice Department to file suit under the antitrust laws to break up
the existing monopoly leagues into several independent competing
leagues . . . .”); Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 646 (“This Article argues
that the government should break up both Major League Baseball and the NFL
to provide for competing economic entities in each sport.”).
281. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 176–77 (discussing the most
effective way to “correct monopoly abuses”).
282. See id. at 179 (“[C]ompetition would certainly lead to an expansion in
the number of cities possessing major league sports teams.”).
283. See id. at 180 (stating that “leagues would compete with one another
for desirable locations” resulting in “multiple bidders for the stadium services
provided by any host city”).
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freeing broadcasters from being forced to compete to air the games
produced by a single monopoly organization.284
At first glance, divestiture may seem like an attractive
solution. Such a proposal would, in theory, obviate the need for
continuing governmental oversight of the sports industry, letting
market forces regulate the leagues.285 In reality, however,
divestiture is neither a realistic nor feasible solution to the
problem of monopoly sports leagues.
As an initial matter, such a plan is highly unlikely to ever be
adopted. Given the popularity of the existing sports leagues,
Congress would face significant backlash if it were to impose such
an extreme restructuring of the industry’s existing industrial
organization.286 Meanwhile, the judiciary also appears unlikely to
enforce such a remedy as the barriers to entry in each sport
foreclose the possibility of a rival emerging to challenge the
existing leagues’ monopolies in court under the Sherman Act.287
Even then, a judge would undoubtedly hesitate to order such an
extreme remedy in light of the fact that Congress has, in several
instances, legislatively sanctioned the leagues’ monopoly power.288
284. See id. (“[C]ompetition among leagues for national TV contracts would
drastically reduce or eliminate the monopoly profits from such contracts
currently enjoyed by leagues.”).
285. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 646 (“The competitive
market resulting from the divestiture will correct the harms that the monopoly
sports leagues inflict on taxpayers and fans.”).
286. Cf. Mitten & Burton, supra note 119, at 127 (“A single major
professional league may be a ‘better quality entertainment product’ that
optimally satisfies consumer demand.”).
287. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 754 (admitting that “[i]f
gambling on judicial decisions were legal, the odds-makers would make those
betting on a divestiture of professional baseball or football through antitrust
litigation decided underdogs”). Instead, Professor Ross has suggested that courts
could order a divestiture of the leagues by retroactively applying section 2 of the
Sherman Act to the leagues’ decades-old exclusionary acts. See Ross, Antitrust
Options, supra note 50, at 163 (stating that, because “there is no statute of
limitations on suits for injunctive relief,” a court could rely on conduct occurring
“several decades ago” when ordering a divestiture). Because the adversely
affected parties no longer exist, however, any such suit would have to come from
the U. S. government, which has shown no inclination to challenge the monopoly
sports leagues.
288. In addition to the SBA, Congress has also blessed the formation of a
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Setting aside the question of whether a divestiture is at all
likely, even if such a plan were to be implemented it is unlikely to
be the panacea that its proponents suggest. First, any divestiture
would require the nearly impossible task of initially allocating the
existing teams among the competing leagues on an equitable basis
to ensure that each of the new organizations started off on even
financial footing. Because the largest media markets in the
country typically only have one or two teams in each sport,
however, a divestiture would risk placing whichever new league(s)
that lacked an existing presence in these cities at a significant
disadvantage with respect to both initial fan interest and potential
television revenues.289
More significantly, though, even if the existing leagues could
be divided in an equitable manner, it is doubtful that prolonged
competition between multiple independent leagues would
ultimately prove sustainable.290 Indeed, as both economists and
legal commentators have noted over the years, professional sports
leagues today appear to operate in many respects as natural
monopolies (that is, an industry where a single firm can supply the
entire market’s demand more efficiently than can competing
firms).291 While such circumstances typically arise in the case of
monopoly professional football league. See supra notes 231–232 and infra notes
332–334 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the SBA and other
legislative authorization for sports monopolies).
289. See Neale, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that competing leagues would
have to “field teams in exactly the same cities (and with exactly the same appeal
to historic loyalties)” to be on equal economic footing).
290. See id. at 6 (“As one surveys the history and present state of the
sporting trades one must admit the possibility . . . that as a matter of
observation there appears to be a strong tendency towards a single
league . . . .”); Weistart, supra note 14, at 1070 (“The tendencies toward
monopolization are unmistakable in the various professional sports.”).
291. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 330 (noting “the arguably natural
monopoly status of any major league sport”); Neale, supra note 16, at 4 (stating
that from an economics perspective, “the theoretical conclusion is clear: each
professional sport is a natural monopoly”); Piraino, A Proposal, supra note 34, at
899 (“[L]eagues should be viewed as ‘natural monopolies’ which have gained
their market dominance by establishing the most efficient means of delivering
their products to consumers.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969) [hereinafter Posner,
Natural Monopoly] (“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be
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utilities, where the construction of multiple competing power grids
or sewer systems would be economically inefficient,292 the nearly
150-year history of professional sports leagues in the United States
suggests that the industry is also destined for a perpetual
monopoly state.293 Throughout this time, a series of new leagues
have emerged to compete with the dominant league in the sport, 294
but only one such challenger has ever survived: baseball’s
American League.295 Even in that case, however, the American
League closely aligned its operations with the existing National
League in 1903, effectively reestablishing monopoly control over
the sport.296
While various factors have undoubtedly contributed to each
individual rival league’s demise,297 one consistent theme emerging
from these periods of competition is a substantial increase in
player salaries as the two competing leagues bid against one
satisfied at lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a
natural monopoly . . . .”).
292. See Christopher Megaw, Reviving Essential Facilities to Prevent REMS
Abuses, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 103, 130 (2013) (“Public utilities are a
classic example of natural monopoly because of the high cost of developing a
distribution network . . . .”).
293. See Quirk, supra note 16, at 64 (“In professional sports, monopoly
control of the sport is the typical situation.”).
294. See, e.g., id. (showing that historically whenever “competitive leagues
arise . . . these challenges invariably lead to merger and return to a monopoly
position”); Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 49, at 256 n.134 (stating that
none of the rival leagues formed since World War II have survived for more than
a few seasons).
295. See Jacob F. Lamme, Comment, The Twelve Year Rain Delay: Why a
Change in Leadership Will Benefit the Game of Baseball, 68 ALB. L. REV. 155,
159 (2004) (“The American League, the most successful of these rival leagues,
was able to threaten the financial position of the National League by looting its
talent.”).
296. Beginning in 1903, the American League and National League
consolidated their operations under the control of a three-member tribunal
known as the “National Commission.” See id. at 160 (discussing the
remonopolization of professional baseball).
297. Such factors can include incompetent management, poor financing, or
unlucky downturns in the national economy. See, e.g., Ross, Monopoly Sports,
supra note 7, at 720–23 (discussing historical factors causing the collapse of
various rival leagues).
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another to sign and retain the best talent.298 Although clearly
beneficial to the players, this competition has historically pushed
labor costs to a point where one of the leagues was no longer
financially viable.299 The failing league has thus either been forced
to merge with the dominant league or else go out of business.300 In
either case, monopoly conditions have inevitably been restored.
To be sure, Congress has also helped contribute to the leagues’
monopoly power through its legislative sanction of certain aspects
of that power.301 Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe
that, unlike most other industries, perpetual competition among
multiple leagues in a single sport will ultimately prove to be
unsustainable. The reason for this is relatively simple: fans prefer
to watch the best players compete, and as a result, whichever
league has the greatest collection of talent will inevitably be

298. See Jamie P.A. Shulman, The NHL Joins In: An Update on Sports
Agent Regulation in Professional Team Sports, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 181, 183 (1997)
(stating that “in the 1970s and 1980s, the NHL, NFL, and NBA faced
competition from rival leagues which resulted in increased player bargaining
power and salaries”).
299. See Rosenbaum, supra note 128, at 797 (explaining that “[b]idding wars
and attendant salary increases” have historically resulted in “ruinous
competition” between established and rival sports leagues). Professor Ross has
characterized this escalation as evidence of exclusionary conduct by the
established leagues hoping to drive the rival out of business. Ross, Monopoly
Sports, supra note 7, at 728. However, such competition is better understood as
a natural side effect of rivalry in the sports industry. See infra notes 302–304
and accompanying text (discussing the pressure for sports leagues to acquire the
most talented players).
300. See Neale, supra note 16, at 6–7 (reporting that history shows that
competing leagues will either reform a monopoly or go bankrupt); Rosenbaum,
supra note 128, at 766 (“[T]he history of rival league competition has led to
either ruinous consequences for the least established challenger, or the ultimate
merger between the two leagues.”). In fact, there is good reason to believe that
most rivals do not wish to compete permanently with the dominant league but
rather hope to eventually join the existing monopoly. See Roger G. Noll,
Alternatives in Sports Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra
note 35, at 423 [hereinafter Noll, Alternatives in Sports] (noting that the
interests of an astute rival “lie in gaining membership in a restored cartel,
which can then reinstitute its restrictive practices”).
301. See infra notes 332–334 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s
willingness to grant leagues limited antitrust immunity).
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viewed as providing the superior product.302 As soon as one league
gains such an advantage, it will then leverage that success to
acquire an even greater share of the elite talent pool, eventually
establishing itself as the only true “major” league in its sport.303
Indeed, nowhere in the world have two competing major leagues in
a nation’s favored sport been able to coexist for any appreciable
length of time.304
Therefore, divestiture appears unlikely to provide a lasting
solution to the problem of monopoly sports leagues. Indeed, even
the proponents of divestiture acknowledge that the competing
organizations would need to continue to coordinate their activities
in several respects post-breakup.305 For example, most proponents
concede that the leagues would need to join forces to produce a
season-ending playoff tournament to crown a single champion in
each sport.306 Some would even go further, allowing the leagues to
schedule interleague games during the regular season.307
While such coordinated activity may seem modest at first, it is
likely to become more involved than the proponents of divestiture
tend to acknowledge. For instance, any jointly scheduled regular or
postseason interleague competition would require the rival leagues
to collectively agree on a television broadcast agreement.308 Thus,
divestiture alone is unlikely to fully alleviate the broadcast-related
302. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 59 (observing that there is a
“natural desire of sports fans to compare the best against the best”).
303. See Edelman, How to Curb, supra note 60, at 301 (stating that “in a
multi-league model, one league eventually gains a comparative advantage and
drives the others out of business”); Mitten & Burton, supra note 119, at 93
(finding that “eventually, fans will prefer the product of one league over that of
another, thereby causing the demise of the disfavored league”).
304. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 330 (discussing the outcome of increased
competition in sports).
305. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 743 (stating that
divestiture would bring about “a new challenge: regulating cooperation between
the competing leagues”).
306. See id. at 723 (conceding that “[r]ival leagues . . . could agree jointly to
produce a Super Bowl or a World Series”).
307. See id. at 723–24 (acknowledging that “competing leagues could
establish inter-league play if it were popular and demanded by fans”).
308. See supra notes 246–248 and accompanying text (discussing the need
for interclub television broadcasting agreements).
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harms inflicted by the existing monopoly sports leagues, at least
with respect to the most valuable programming (i.e., the
postseason championship competition).309 Moreover, the leagues
would likely need to adopt some common labor restraints, such as
a salary cap and entry-player draft, to ensure that one
organization did not become overly dominant on the playing field.
Consequently, while divestiture appears in theory to be a
sound, free-market solution to curb the anticompetitive practices of
monopoly sports leagues, in practice it is unlikely to provide
lasting relief to the public. Instead, a divestiture would likely
either result in one dominant league eventually reestablishing
monopoly control in each sport, or else it would require relatively
significant coordination between the competing leagues, thereby
undermining many of the purported benefits of introducing
competition to the industry.
B. Promotion and Relegation
Recognizing that divestiture is unlikely to provide a realistic
and sustainable solution to the problem of monopoly sports
leagues, some commentators have contended that the industry
should instead be forced to adopt a concept employed in European
soccer leagues: promotion and relegation.310 Specifically, in leagues
like the English Premier League, membership in the sport’s elite
organization is not fixed but instead changes on a regular basis as
the best minor league teams are promoted to replace the worst
performing major league teams (who are themselves relegated to a
lower level of competition).311 Because this same promotion and
relegation system is implemented throughout England’s many
309. See Daniel C. Glazer, Can’t Anybody Here Run This Game? The Past,
Present and Future of Major League Baseball, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 339, 415
(1999) (noting that playoff games typically receive higher television ratings than
regular season telecasts).
310. See generally Haddock et al., supra note 4; Ross, Antitrust Options,
supra note 50; Ross & Szymanski, Open Competition, supra note 2.
311. See, e.g., Edelman & Doyle, supra note 38, at 408 (discussing the
operational structure of European soccer leagues).
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tiers of professional play, a small-town team beginning in the
lowest classification of play could conceivably one day earn the
right to be promoted all the way to the Premier League.312 Thus,
unlike the “closed” sports league model employed by the U.S.
leagues313—in which league membership remains static from year
to year—a promotion and relegation system provides new teams
with the potential opportunity to one day compete at the major
league level, while at the same time incentivizing the worst
performing teams to improve or else face demotion to a lower level
of play.314
Proponents of the promotion and relegation model argue that
implementing such a system in the United States would not only
increase fan enjoyment—making the race to avoid relegation
almost as entertaining as the chase to qualify for the playoffs315—
but also curb the ability of teams to demand significant public
stadium subsidies from their host cities.316 In particular, these
scholars contend that, rather than compete to acquire or retain one
of a fixed number of existing professional teams, in a promotion
and relegation system cities desiring a major league franchise
would instead simply form a new team with the hope of one day
achieving promotion to the highest level of competition.317 Existing
312. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 24 (explaining that each team, even
those “in the lower tiers is endowed with the potential to improve and progress,
perhaps even to the Premier League”).
313. See Ross, Antitrust Options, supra note 50, at 165 (describing “North
American sports leagues [as being] closed” insofar as “membership of the league
is controlled by existing members”).
314. See id. at 166–67 (stating that the threat of relegation “would increase
the incentive for current major league clubs to” improve “to avoid relegation”).
315. See id. at 167 (stating that promotion and relegation would allow fans
to follow the race “among the lesser teams in the league to avoid relegation”).
316. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 59 (concluding that “there is every
reason to believe that a system of promotion and relegation
would . . . substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the stadium rent-seeking
problem”).
317. See Ross & Szymanski, Open Competition, supra note 2, at 629 (finding
that “a club’s threat to relocate without tax subsidies [would be] diluted by the
possibility that the team itself may be relegated and, more importantly, by the
creation of alternative entry routes for cities that do not possess a major league
team”).
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teams would thus, in theory, lose their leverage over
municipalities, decreasing the level of public subsidization of the
sports industry.318
As with divestiture, the imposition of a promotion and
relegation system seems at first glance like an attractive solution
to the problem of monopoly sports leagues. However, like
divestiture, a promotion and relegation system is also incredibly
unlikely to be implemented in the United States. As an initial
matter, even though such a solution would appear less drastic than
a divestiture of the existing leagues, Congress is still unlikely to
mandate that the leagues adopt such a system given the political
risks involved.319 Indeed, considering the popularity of the existing
leagues, as well as the well-entrenched tradition of closed sports
leagues in the United States, the imposition of such a radical
structural change—especially one imported from European soccer,
no less—would likely generate significant public backlash among
many of the nation’s sports fans. Meanwhile, the implementation
of such a system is even less likely to come from the judiciary.
Even if a victorious section 2 case could be brought against the
leagues, divestiture would provide a more natural remedy than
would the judicial implementation of a promotion and relegation
system.320
Moreover, even if a court or Congress were willing to impose
promotion and relegation on the existing leagues, the initial
318. See id. (contending that “the ability of teams to extract subsidies” under
a promotion and relegation model would be “either reduced or eliminated
altogether”). Even in Britain, however, the government has occasionally devoted
public funds to renovate unsafe stadiums. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at
17 (“[O]ver the past fifteen years the British government has allocated
significant funds to renovate stadiums not just in England but throughout Great
Britain.”).
319. See Ross, Antitrust Options, supra note 50, at 171 (conceding that a
promotion and relegation system “would face opposition [in Congress] from
monopoly sports league owners and some risk-averse fans fearful that their
team might be relegated”).
320. Divestiture has historically been used to address anticompetitive
conduct by monopoly firms. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Modular Confines of Mobile
Networks: Are iPhones iPhony?, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 67, 74–75 (2011)
(discussing the divestiture of the American Telegraph & Telephone Company
following a successful prosecution under section 2).

REGULATING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

639

transaction costs in implementing such a system would be
significant.321 While European soccer would provide a working
model of how the concept could be implemented in the United
States, that model would undoubtedly have to be modified to
accommodate the differences between the European and American
sports leagues. For example, annual changes in the membership of
each league would not only affect the geographically based
divisional structure employed by all four monopoly leagues but
would also have significant implications on the leagues’ existing
and future television contracts (whose value depends in large part
on the precise roster of media markets represented within a
particular league). Neither of these concerns is as present in the
largely single-nation based European leagues given their smaller
geographic footprint.
Additionally, while both professional baseball and hockey
already have existing, multi-tiered minor league systems in place
that could accommodate a promotion and relegation model, the
same cannot be said for professional football or basketball. 322
Indeed, both the NFL and NBA rely to a large extent on our
nation’s colleges and universities to develop future professional
talent. These college teams are numerous and, in many cases,
already have strong and devoted fan followings, undermining the
economic viability of a multi-tiered system of professional minor
leagues in football and basketball. Thus, it is questionable whether
enough demand would exist in these sports to support a sufficient
series of new professional minor leagues.
Furthermore, even if such a system were to be implemented, it
too would likely require governmental regulation. Indeed, the
existing teams in each major league would have a strong incentive
321. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 60 (conceding that the “transitional
costs of moving from the current system” to a promotion and relegation model
could be viewed as a disadvantage).
322. Admittedly, the NBA has a seventeen-team Development League that
could provide part of the framework for a promotion and relegation system in
professional basketball. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 256 n.234
(describing the NBA’s Development League). However, additional levels of play
would need to be created to have an effective, European-style promotion system
for professional basketball in the United States.
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to construct any promotion system in such a manner that would
make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to displace a current
team at the major league level.323 Consequently, the government
would inevitably need to intervene and design the rules governing
promotion and relegation to ensure that the system served its
policy objectives.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, promotion and
relegation would not alleviate all of the harms inflicted on the
public by the U.S. monopoly sports leagues. While the level of
municipal stadium subsidies would likely decline,324 promotion and
relegation would not curb the leagues’ monopoly power in the
broadcasting market as television networks would still be forced to
negotiate with a single monopoly major league in each sport.
Consequently, barring additional government intervention, the
existing leagues would continue to engage in the anticompetitive
television broadcast practices discussed above.
Therefore, promotion and relegation is, at best, a partial
solution to the problem of unregulated monopoly sports leagues.
Even then, such a system would likely necessitate some of the very
same government intervention that its proponents wish to avoid.
Consequently, an alternative solution is needed.
V. Government Regulation of the Monopoly Professional Sports
Leagues Is Needed
As this Article has established, the four major U.S.
professional sports leagues routinely use their monopoly power to
impose various anticompetitive restraints on the public.325
Moreover, due to assorted structural or conceptual barriers, federal
antitrust law—the primary existing source of regulation governing
the leagues—has failed to adequately protect consumers from
323. See Haddock et al., supra note 4, at 23 (characterizing America’s closed
sports league structure as “deeply rooted”).
324. See supra notes 312–314 and accompanying text (discussing the likely
fate of subsidies under a promotion and relegation model).
325. See supra Part III (discussing the monopoly power of professional
sports leagues).
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these practices.326 Consequently, this Article asserts that the
creation of a federal regulatory authority to supervise the
professional sports industry is both necessary and warranted to
safeguard the public interest.327
Scholars have traditionally recognized that government
regulation offers a sound method of protecting consumers from
natural monopolies, as the introduction of competition into such
industries
will
typically
prove
to
be
economically
counterproductive.328 Although the sports industry may not meet
the classical economic definition of a natural monopoly, its historic
gravitation towards the formation of monopoly sports leagues is
both incontrovertible and, apparently, inevitable.329 Furthermore,
in light of the many barriers to entry existing in the industry,330
the chance that a new league forms organically to challenge the
existing leagues appears exceedingly unlikely. Thus, barring a
highly unlikely government intervention of a far more radical
nature—along the lines of the unsatisfactory divestiture or

326. See supra Part II (discussing the failures of antitrust law in regulating
professional sports leagues).
327. Congress clearly has the constitutional authority to subject the
professional sports leagues to government regulation under its interstate
commerce powers. See, e.g., Mitten & Burton, supra note 119, at 130–31
(“Pursuant to its authority to regulate interstate commerce, Congress may
govern the conduct of the members of national professional sports leagues.”).
328. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 363 (6th ed.
2003) (“The law’s traditional answer to the problem of natural monopoly was
public utility or common carrier regulation.”); see also Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1364 (1998) (stating that regulatory agencies have tended
to focus on “market segments that have natural monopoly characteristics” in
recent years). While some have contested the appropriateness of subjecting
natural monopolies to governmental regulation, see, e.g., Posner, Natural
Monopoly, supra note 291, it is warranted in this case given the many harms
inflicted on the public by the monopoly sports leagues and the lack of viable
market-based alternatives. See supra Part III (discussing the harms from
professional sports monopolies).
329. See supra notes 291–304 and accompanying text (discussing the
historical trend of monopolization in sports leagues).
330. See supra notes 119–140 and accompanying text (summarizing the
market forces that act as barriers to entry in the sports industry).
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promotion and relegation proposals discussed above331—
government regulation of the professional sports industry is
warranted to curb the leagues’ anticompetitive tendencies.
Indeed, government regulation is particularly justified here
because Congress shoulders some of the blame for the formation
and the perpetuation of the existing sports league monopolies.332
Not only did Congress grant all four leagues the legal right to
negotiate collective television agreements on behalf of their teams
in the SBA, thereby eliminating competition between individual
franchises in the broadcast market,333 but it also expressly
sanctioned the formation of a single monopoly professional football
league in the mid-1960s.334
The idea of a regulatory agency for the professional sports
industry is not new. As far back as 1972, Congress debated a
proposal to create a Federal Sports Commission to regulate the
major sports leagues.335 The proposed agency’s power would have
331. See supra Part IV (discussing alternative proposals to government
regulation of monopolies).
332. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 168 (observing that Congress has
consistently supported the leagues’ monopoly power); see also Ross, Monopoly
Sports, supra note 7, at 645 (asserting that when Congress suspends the
“application of the antitrust laws for particular industries, some form of
government regulation designed to protect consumers . . . almost always
accompanies such exemptions. [MLB] and the NFL are glaring exceptions to
this practice.”).
333. See supra notes 230–232 and accompanying text (discussing the
passage of the SBA). The SBA’s grant of monopoly power is all the more
worrisome given that the legislation was passed without any significant
congressional deliberation. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 336 (noting that the
SBA was passed “without any serious reflection or debate”).
334. Specifically, after several years of vigorous—and arguably
destructive—competition between the rival American Football League and NFL
in the 1960s, the two leagues jointly petitioned Congress asking for the
legislative authorization to merge their operations, thereby restoring monopoly
conditions to the sport. Congress agreed—in exchange for the formation of new
expansion teams located in the districts of several influential legislators—and,
as a result, the NFL’s monopoly status has never been seriously threatened
again. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 269 (reporting legislation
providing antitrust exemption); Grauer, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing
Congress’s approval of the AFL–NFL merger); Piraino, A Proposal, supra note
34, at 898 n.37 (reporting that the AFL and NFL competed from 1960 to 1967).
335. See DANIELSON, supra note 49, at 291 (“Nothing came of legislation
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been limited to regulating four areas: (i) the leagues’ television
blackout restrictions; (ii) the sale of professional sports teams;
(iii) the leagues’ entry draft procedures; and (iv) limitations on
competition between teams for players (i.e., the so-called “reserve
clause”).336 After the proposed Commission failed to gain traction
in the 1970s, the idea largely disappeared from the on-going policy
debate.337
The time has come for the government to take a more active
role in regulating the professional sports industry. If anything, it is
surprising that the leagues have been able to operate free from
government intervention for so long given the current scope of
their multibillion dollar operations,338 their anticompetitive
tendencies,339 and their significant reliance on government
subsidies.340 Indeed, other nations have subjected their
professional sports leagues’ expansion decisions, 341 internal
rules and regulations, 342 and even ticket pricing to government
introduced in 1972 to establish a Federal Sports Commission empowered to
regulate the sale of teams, transfer of franchise, territorial restrictions, and
broadcast rights . . . .”); Noll, Alternatives in Sports, supra note 300, at 423–24
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the 1972 proposal).
336. See Rivkin, supra note 35, at 409 n.68 (summarizing the proposed
agency’s authority); see also Grow, In Defense Of, supra note 31, at 240 (“The
reserve clause was a provision formerly included in all baseball player contracts
that precluded players from negotiating future contracts with anyone but their
then-current employer.”).
337. One notable exception comes from leading sports economist Professor
Andrew Zimbalist, who has proposed a federal regulatory body to oversee the
MLB. See Andrew Zimbalist, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE
BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 182–86 (1992).
338. See Szymanski, supra note 2 (reporting estimated market value of major
sports leagues to be $67 billion).
339. See supra Part III (discussing leagues’ anticompetitive conduct).
340. See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text (discussing subsidies for
stadiums).
341. See 2 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND
BUSINESS 870 (1997) (reporting that the creation of expansion franchises in the
Dominican Republic’s winter baseball league is regulated by the government).
342. See id. at 1251–52 (noting that Greece’s Sports Secretariat has oversight
authority over Greek professional sports leagues’ internal rules and regulations);
see also id. at 990–91 (observing that Venezuela’s National Sports Institute
similarly has the authority to regulate the nation’s professional sports).
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regulatory oversight.343
The federal government is best positioned to address the U.S.
monopoly sports leagues’ anticompetitive practices. Rather than
regulating the industry through piecemeal legislation, this Article
asserts that the creation of a specialized agency—or, alternatively,
a regulatory body placed within an existing agency—can best align
the activities of the leagues with the public interest, while at the
same time taking into account the industry’s unique economic
characteristics.344 Unlike the judiciary, which will typically have
only a single challenged restraint before it at a given time, an
expert agency can develop a better appreciation for the entire
framework of a sports league’s operations. Thus, the agency will be
better suited to appraise the need for a particular league practice
and, if necessary, understand how to best amend it to protect
consumer welfare.
While the scope of such a regulatory authority’s responsibility
could, of course, be as broad or narrow as Congress chooses, the
foregoing analysis has shown that, at a minimum, the agency
should have the authority to regulate the professional sports
leagues’ (i) expansion and relocation policies and (ii) broadcast
activities.345 First, the regulatory body should have the authority
to conduct periodic reviews of each league’s rate of expansion to
determine whether the leagues have adequately satisfied the
existing level of demand in the marketplace.346 As noted above,
economic self-interest will often motivate teams to artificially
343. See id. at 1252 (stating that Greece subjects professional sports teams’
ticket pricing decisions to government regulation); see also Luca Barani, The
Regulation of Sport in the European Union: Courts and Markets, in THE
REGULATION OF SPORT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 107, 110 tbl. 6.1 (Barbara Bogusz
et al. eds., 2007) (describing both France and Spain as adopting an
“interventionist” approach to government regulation of the professional sports
industry).
344. See supra notes 60–77 and accompanying text (discussing the
industry’s unique economic characteristics).
345. See supra Part III (discussing league expansion and television
broadcasting).
346. See Weistart, supra note 14, at 1037 (suggesting that “normal market
forces will not insure that an optimal number of franchises will be established,”
which justifies regulation).

REGULATING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

645

restrict the number of franchises in a league below the level that
the market would otherwise bear.347 At the same time, over
expansion can spread the existing player talent pool too thin across
a league, lowering its quality of play to an unacceptable level while
also decreasing each individual team’s chances of winning a
championship and thereby lessening fan interest.348
By developing expertise in each league’s operations, a
regulatory authority would be better equipped than the judiciary
(or, from the public’s perspective, the self-interested leagues
themselves) to reliably conduct this delicate balancing act and
ensure that the public interest is protected.349 Should the
regulators conclude that the formation of additional teams is
warranted, they could then either select the new markets
themselves or direct the league to choose the requisite number of
expansion sites under regulatory supervision. Similarly, the
regulatory authority could both monitor the league’s imposition of
an expansion fee (or set the appropriate compensation itself) and
supervise its implementation of an expansion draft allowing the
new teams to acquire existing players, thereby ensuring that the
new franchises are admitted on an equitable basis.350
While a more accurate calibration of the number of teams in a
league to the overall demand for franchises will go a long way
towards reducing the leagues’ bargaining leverage over cities,
Congress should also give the regulatory body the authority to
regulate franchise relocation to fully address the stadium subsidy
issue. Indeed, because the demand for teams will likely always
outstrip the number of franchises that a league can reasonably
347. See supra notes 155–179 and accompanying text (discussing the
economic incentives for artificial franchise scarcity).
348. See supra notes 149–154 and accompanying text (discussing the harms
of over expansion).
349. Cf. John C. Dodge, The Baseball Monopoly as Public Utility: Is It Time
for Regulation?, 13 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 6 (1995) (observing that utility
regulators have decades of experience deciding franchising issues like expansion
and relocation).
350. Cf. DANIELSON, supra note 49, at 198 (noting that expansion teams
have historically played “poorly in their early years because established
organizations have been unwilling to make available sufficient talent to permit
new clubs to field competitive teams”).
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support, cities will continue to see teams use the threat of
relocation to extract valuable stadium concessions, even if the
leagues are forced to expand.351 Moreover, league expansion and
relocation decisions will often go hand in hand, with the most just
outcome in many cases being to reject a team’s proposed relocation
bid while promptly awarding the unserved city an expansion
franchise.352 This allows the unrepresented market to get the team
it has been seeking while at the same time letting the existing host
city maintain its historic allegiance to its current club.
This is not to suggest that the regulatory authority should
always prevent a franchise from moving to a new city as
circumstances will inevitably arise where, due to significant
demographic changes, a new market will have significantly greater
demand for a team than its current host community.353 Indeed,
during a series of congressional hearings examining the relocation
issue in the 1980s, some legislators proposed establishing set
criteria governing when a professional sports team could
relocate.354 Rather than categorically rejecting most relocation
bids, the regulators should instead evaluate such proposals by
weighing a variety of factors, including: (i) the club’s financial
losses, if any, in its existing market; (ii) the inadequacy of the
351. See Piraino, Antitrust Rationale, supra note 48, at 1717 (acknowledging
that “[a]t some point, each professional sports league will reach a capacity
beyond which it cannot effectively expand”).
352. See Grow, In Defense of, supra note 31, at 237 (explaining that a
replacement team does not fully alleviate the harm inflicted on a city after its
existing team relocates); see also Wong, supra note 161, at 79 (observing that
“expansion and relocation are intimately tied together”).
353. See Arthur T. Johnson, The Sports Franchise Relocation Issue and
Public Policy Responses, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT, supra note 19, at 219, 235
(suggesting that “to freeze the status quo with regard to the distribution of
professional sports franchises” would disadvantage “those cities without sports
franchises but that desire a team”); Wong, supra note 161, at 20 n.57 (quoting
Senator Frank Lautenberg as observing that relocation may be necessary to
address “changing markets and changing population”).
354. STEPHEN R. LOWE, THE KID ON THE SANDLOT: CONGRESS AND
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 1910–1992, at 124 (Douglas Noverr & Lawrence Ziewacz
eds., 1995) (discussing a proposal by Senator Arlen Specter that would have “set
up criteria for team movements within professional football, such as proof that
the team had lost money for three consecutive years and that the playing
facilities were inadequate”).
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team’s current stadium or arena; (iii) the level of fan support in
both the team’s current and proposed future host cities (including
both municipalities’ population and income demographics); (iv) the
current host city’s remaining debt obligations on the team’s
existing stadium; and (v) the effect that the relocation would have
on the league’s existing rivalries and geographic distribution of
teams.355 Through such a calculus, the regulatory body will be best
positioned to determine whether a proposed relocation is truly in
the public interest or rather would simply serve to advance the
franchise owner’s short-term profit motives.
Second, the regulatory body should also be given the authority
to regulate the monopoly leagues’ broadcasting practices. Unlike
expansion and relocation, which would require continued agency
supervision of the industry, any oversight of the leagues’
broadcasting activities would be more limited. Indeed, upon
conducting an initial analysis of the extent to which the industry’s
current broadcasting practices harm the public, the regulatory
authority could issue a set of regulations to guide leagues’ future
activities in this area.356 Once in place, regulators would merely
need to monitor the leagues’ compliance, a process that should be
relatively unobtrusive given the public nature of the broadcasting
practices and the relatively lengthy duration of many broadcast
agreements.
Although the exact policy prescriptions that should be adopted
in this area are beyond the scope of this Article, the regulatory
body should nevertheless be instructed to conduct a thorough
review of both the leagues’ collective broadcast licensing activities
as well as their imposition of blackouts. In both cases, regulators
should consider not only the harm the practices inflict on the
355. See, e.g., Lazaroff, Antitrust Implications, supra note 152, at 219
(discussing relevant factors in a relocation decision); Quirk, supra note 16, at 57
(discussing reasons for ten franchise moves in baseball); Ross, Monopoly Sports,
supra note 7, at 704 n.264 (discussing regulatory proposals set forth by
members of Congress).
356. In addition, the regulatory body would be positioned to prevent the
leagues from entering broadcast agreements that injure the public without
necessarily violating antitrust law. See Boliek, supra note 217, at 547–48
(noting that an agreement to exclusively broadcast the Super Bowl on DirecTV
might not violate the Sherman Act but would significantly harm consumers).
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public but also any beneficial justifications for the restrictions.
While such an evaluation would, of course, be similar to a rule-ofreason analysis under antitrust law,357 a regulatory authority
would be better positioned than the judiciary to fully appreciate
the role that such restraints play in the overall league framework,
as well as to tailor specific policy solutions to best advance the
public interest. For instance, with respect to the leagues’ collective
television licensing, if regulators determine that consumers would
be better served by having teams compete for broadcast
agreements, they could work with the leagues to devise revenue
sharing mechanisms to ensure that individual teams did not
parlay advantages in national television revenues into perpetual
superiority on the playing field.358 Left to their own devices, the
leagues may never reach a suitable agreement on such matters
due to the significant transaction costs involved.359
While this Article has focused on the harms inflicted by
monopoly sports leagues in the areas of league expansion and
television broadcasting, Congress could also grant the proposed
regulatory body authority over other facets of the industry. For
example, scholars have noted that various league trademark
licensing and labor practices may also harm the public.360
Although a comprehensive discussion of these issues is beyond the
scope of this Article, Congress could reasonably determine that

357. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of
reason).
358. See SCULLY, supra note 6, at 27–28 (explaining that disparities in
television revenue can promote “inequality on the playing field”).
359. Cf. Ross & Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient, supra note 53, at 229
(noting that “[t]ransaction costs [may] inhibit club-run leagues from maximizing
profits from the sale of broadcast and internet rights” as owners could be
“unable to agree among themselves on how to divide the proceeds”).
360. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have “Market Power?”:
Exploring the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men’s
Basketball Player Labor, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 554 (2010) (stating that
“[a]ccording to one court” league-imposed, draft-eligibility age restrictions harm
“consumers who may otherwise prefer to attend games featuring the excluded
players”); Mitten, supra note 84, at 930 (asserting that exclusive, league-wide
trademark licensing “likely increases retail prices to the detriment of consumer
welfare”).

REGULATING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

649

these activities—or others—should also be subject to regulatory
oversight.
Despite the benefits that a federal sports regulatory authority
would provide to the public, several likely objections to the creation
of such an entity can be anticipated. First, critics may assert that
such a proposal is unlikely ever to be passed by Congress. Given
the general deregulatory spirit that continues to permeate
Washington, the odds are admittedly slim that Congress would
agree in the near future to create a new government office to
regulate an industry with the social capital of the major
professional sports leagues. This is especially true given that the
leagues would undoubtedly lobby vigorously against the creation of
an administrative body possessing the authority to regulate their
expansion and broadcasting activities.361
These lobbying efforts could be offset to some degree. First,
Congress could rally other well-organized constituencies behind
the cause. For instance, television networks would stand to benefit
from increased competition in the leagues’ broadcasting activities
and therefore may be willing to support the effort to subject the
sports industry to governmental oversight. Moreover, Congress
could also attempt to temper the leagues’ opposition by offering
them some benefits as part of the legislation. For example, in
exchange for acquiescing to government regulation, the leagues
could be given targeted or complete immunity from private
antitrust lawsuits. Indeed, with a federal regulatory authority in
place, the need for a private right of action against the sports
leagues would be largely obviated. By extending to the leagues
additional antitrust immunity, they would no longer face the
prospect of defending their practices in what often proves to be
unpredictable, expensive litigation. Such a concession would even
benefit the antitrust-exempt MLB, solidifying the league’s oftcriticized antitrust immunity.362
361. See McCann, supra note 61, at 780 (asserting that the leagues “are
well-positioned to exert disproportionate influence on congressional
decisionmaking”); cf. DANIELSON, supra note 49, at 98 (discussing the
“substantial political influence of team owners, leagues, and their corporate
allies”).
362. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the ever-present
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Nevertheless, the odds that such legislation would be passed
in the short-term are not great. One can envision a day in the not
too distant future, though, when federal regulation of the
professional sports industry could gain more traction. Because
most sports facilities have an estimated lifespan of thirty to forty
years, many existing stadiums will be due for replacement or
significant renovation beginning in the 2020s.363 Commentators
have speculated that this will set off another wave of extravagant
subsidy demands by the professional sports leagues.364 In light of
the budgetary challenges currently afflicting all levels of
government, the leagues’ request for lavish new stadiums built at
taxpayer expense could generate greater public backlash than in
previous decades. If such demands are accompanied by the
relocation of several communities’ cherished franchises, the public
outcry over the leagues’ unchecked monopoly power could
potentially reach the point that federal regulation becomes more
plausible.
Second, critics will likely assert that federal intervention in
the immensely popular professional sports industry is generally
undesirable.365 For example, one such commentator has argued
that “the history of regulatory commissions is not one which
instills overwhelming confidence in such a device as a protector of
the interests of the general public.”366 This is a legitimate concern.
Unfortunately, while federal regulation may not be ideal, in this
case it represents the only plausible alternative to the leagues’
continued abuse of their unregulated monopoly power. Indeed,
because new entry by a rival firm is highly unlikely,367 and because
risk that MLB’s antitrust exemption will be revoked).
363. See QUIRK & FORT, supra note 2, at 147 (stating that stadiums and
arenas have “a life expectancy of twenty-five to forty years”).
364. See WEILER, supra note 54, at 276 (predicting that “Americans will
experience (probably in the 2020s) yet another wave of stadium/arena
construction”).
365. See, e.g., Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 702 (“Regulation is a
poor means of addressing the problems monopoly sports leagues cause.”).
366. Quirk, supra note 16, at 65.
367. See supra notes 119–139 and accompanying text (discussing barriers to
entrance into industry).
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proposed free market mechanisms to counteract the sports leagues’
monopoly power are not viable,368 government regulation offers the
only means through which the anticompetitive tendencies of the
professional sports industry can be reliably curbed. Nevertheless,
Congress can help quell fears that heavy-handed government
regulation will ruin a tremendously popular industry by narrowly
limiting the scope of the proposed regulatory body’s authority
along the lines discussed above,369 thereby ensuring that any
government interference with the leagues is no greater than
necessary to curb their anticompetitive conduct.
Finally, a common criticism of any specialized agency is that it
will be subject to regulatory capture by the supervised industry
and therefore ultimately prove unable to protect the public interest
effectively.370 In other words, agencies are often predisposed to
favor the firms they supervise because bureaucrats frequently
come from, or one day hope to work for, the regulated industry.371
Commentators have contended that any regulatory authority
governing the professional sports industry would be especially
prone to capture by both team owners and the players’ unions, who
would be strongly motivated to lobby the agency to secure
favorable treatment.372 While regulatory capture is a risk for any
specialized agency, scholars have nevertheless recognized that its
effects can be minimized through principles of sound agency
368. See supra Part IV and accompanying text (discussing alternative
reform proposals).
369. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (discussing potential powers
of a federal regulatory body).
370. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of
Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q. J. ECON.
1089 (1991) (discussing regulatory capture).
371. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, Dampening Financial Regulatory Cycles, 65
FLA. L. REV. 1597, 1610–11 (2013) (identifying the “variety of mechanisms [that]
cause regulators to favor the industry they are regulating”); Posner, Natural
Monopoly, supra note 291, at 624 (“Because regulatory commissions are of
necessity intimately involved in the affairs of a particular industry, the
regulators and their staffs are exposed to strong interest-group pressures.”).
372. See Ross, Monopoly Sports, supra note 7, at 703 (contending that team
owners would “have strong incentives to organize and lobby for regulations that
serve their interests”).
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design, such as by insulating agency officials from the threat of
removal by the legislative or executive branches, and by providing
the agency with dedicated sources of funding independent from the
political process.373 Moreover, even if the proposed sports
regulatory body were to be captured to some extent, it would still
be preferable to the status quo, in which the leagues exploit their
monopoly power free from practically any effective governmental
oversight.
Therefore, despite the anticipated criticisms of subjecting the
professional sports industry to federal regulation, the creation of a
federal regulatory body for the sports industry appears to be the
best means through which to protect the public from the
anticompetitive practices of the U.S. monopoly sports leagues.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has presented the case for federal regulation of
the professional sports industry. Because antitrust law has failed
to effectively regulate the industry, four monopoly sports leagues
have been able to use their largely unregulated monopoly power to
injure the public in a variety of ways. With alternative, proposed
market-based solutions to this problem appearing unrealistic and
ineffective, this Article has concluded that the formation of a
federal sports regulatory body offers the best means for ensuring
that the professional sports industry does not continue to harm the
public in the future, while simultaneously imposing minimal
disruption on an extremely popular industry.

373. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16, 42–45 (2010) (considering
mechanisms to improve agency independence); see also PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
(Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013) (compiling proposals on the
prevention of regulatory capture).

